THE IMPACT OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
ON THE MIDGRADE (O-3/4) ARMY OFFICER

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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This study examines attitudes of midgrade US Army officers. Attention is given to the most recently conducted operations other than war (OOTW) in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. The goal of this research is to understand how participation in these events has affected officers attitudes, and the implications of these experiences for the future.

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Of the 113 officers surveyed forty (35 %) had participated in at least one OOTW mission. Ninety percent of those officers report that their participation in an OOTW has not changed their propensity toward using lethal force in the future. Nineteen percent of the officers rated the missions as not appropriate for their unit.

The attitudes of midgrade officers in this study are compared to results of previous studies of Multinational Force Observers (MFO) deployments by an airborne infantry battalion in 1984 and a light infantry battalion in 1990 and the 6-502nd's UN deployment to Macedonia in 1992.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study examines how various events have affected the attitudes of midgrade US Army officers. Particular attention is given to the impact of the most recently conducted operations other than war (OOTW) in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. The goal of this research is to understand the consequences of these events, how participation in them has affected attitudes, and perhaps more importantly, the implications of these experiences for the future. This study is accomplished by an examination of the relevant literature and the administration and analysis of a survey to current midgrade army officers.

Although the US Constitution charges the Congress with raising and supporting armies, and the president to serve as the commander in chief, the fundamental (and often stated) purpose of the US Army is to fight and win the nation's wars.[1] The elimination of the formidable Warsaw Pact/Soviet threat and the resulting new world order has fueled political pressures to capitalize on the so-called "peace dividend." This pressure has left the US Army's leadership struggling to define its niche in this dynamic environment. Simultaneously, the lack of any other organization adequately equipped and capable of performing peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations as the US Army (and her sister-services) has caused the military to become the "force of choice" to respond to the many new threats in this new world order.

These non-warfighting missions or operations other than war (OOTW) are redirecting the Army's focus and consuming a great deal of the Army's declining resources. There are also inestimable costs and perils associated with redefining the Army's organizational mind-set and

culture. The worst case scenario may be that the Army is incapable of performing its most important and potentially dangerous mission: warfighting. Karl von Clausewitz cautioned against the dangers of not having a potent army when he issued the following statement:

> Let us not hear of Generals who conquer without bloodshed. If bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to War, but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, until someone steps in with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our body.[2]

The transformation the Army is presently undergoing, in part, as a result of the recent OOTW missions, is potentially dangerous. The warrior ethos and associated skills required for warfighting may not be compatible with this OOTW role. The very doctrine developed by the army to execute these increasing missions might be misguided as well. Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Bunker voiced this concern in his article "Rethinking OOTW" in which he suggests the army's OOTW concept is flawed:

> To maintain the Army's land warfare dominance, the June 1993 edition of FM 100-5 documents the Cold War's end, emphasizes shifting to a joint operations focus and anticipates the US needs for a force-projection Army in a rapidly changing world. The inclusion of the operations other than war (OOTW) concept in the new FM 100-5 is regarded as vital to operations doctrine because it broadens the Army's mission capability across the operational continuum. The OOTW concept, however, is flawed.[3]

Bunker argues that the deployment of US forces in many OOTW situations may well be counterproductive, as it concedes the political and military initiative to the opponent. He concludes that "it is of little wonder, then, that most recent experiences under OOTW's rubric have been political and military failures."[4] The midgrade army officer is undoubtedly shaped by these failures, in many cases as a direct participant.

Background to the Research Question

The factors that potentially influence the midgrade army officer's attitudes are virtually endless. The effect that both OOTW and peace operations have had on the midgrade officer is only one aspect or dimension of these influencing factors. Furthermore, not all OOTW and peace

operations are similar. To understand what effects the OOTW that were surveyed in this thesis have had on the respondents, it is first useful to understand the historical and broader sociopolitical context in which these OOTW operations have occurred.

The Life-Course Paradigm

Using an adaptation of the Life-Course Theory Model developed by Paul A. Gade of the US Army Research Institute (ARI), this research examines and identifies some key-influencing factors upon the midgrade Army officer. Gade's life-course theory holds that experiences earlier in officers' lives shape the long-term paths their lives follow. Gade asserts, "Military service, particularly in wartime is a prime example of a life-shaping experience across the life span."[5] He further suggests that to understand individual development and change, an understanding of the sociohistorical changes that are occurring around the individual.[6] These factors influence, to varying degrees, the experiences of the individual midgrade officer.

For this research, these factors are divided into three general categories: (1) historic and military-political factors, (2) military doctrine and policies, and (3) sociocultural factors. The life-course theory as applied to this research is modeled in figure 1.

Historic and Military-political	Military Doctrine and Policies	Social and Cultural
- VIETNAM - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - LEBANON - GRENADA - JUST CAUSE - DESERT STORM - NEW WORLD ORDER - FOREIGN POLICY/UN - OOTW OPERATIONS	- DOCTRINE & TRAINING - READINESS - FUNDING - FORCE SIZE - PERSTEMPO - COMMAND & CONTROL - AWARDS	- DEMOGRAPHICS - DECLINING BENEFITS - DRAWDOWN - GAYS IN THE MILITARY - MEDIA/PUBLIC OPINION - MORAL & ETHICAL - WARRIOR SPIRIT - REASONS FOR JOINING

ENVIRONMENT

INDIVIDUAL BELIEFS & ATTITUDES	→	PERSONAL MILITARY EXPERIENCES	→	MILITARY EXPERIENCES (COLLECTIVE)	→	ATTITUDES ON OOTW

Figure 1. Life-Course Theory Influencing Factors Model

Relevant Historical Events

Most of the majors in this survey began their commissioned service between 1981

and 1985. The majority began their commitment to the Army between 1977 and 1981 in an

officer precommissioning program (United States Military Academy, Reserve Officers Training

Corps, or Officer Candidate School). To fully understand the attitudes and mind-set of today's

midgrade officer, it is useful to examine the events that forged the military culture into which that

officer matriculated. Hence, the study must go back even farther than just the mid-1980s. It is

important to understand the culture and events that molded the leaders who have produced this

generation of majors.

The leaders who were battalion and brigade commanders in the mid-1980s are now the

Army's senior leadership. They were deeply influenced by Vietnam, both on a personal and

professional level. These senior officers began their military service in the mid-to-late 1960s.

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Biased by their experiences, these senior leaders established the environment that molded the Army's current midgrade officers.

The following section briefly addresses the significant military operations undertaken by the United States beginning with the Vietnam War. The last major operation examined in this section is the largest Army operation since Vietnam, Desert Storm and its subsequent post-conflict operation, Operation Provide Comfort. The section ends with a brief mention of the Los Angeles riots. Although militarily not a major operation, the fact that regular Army forces were dispatched within the United States to aid in the restoration of civil order warrants its inclusion.

Vietnam Experience (1962-1975)

As America's longest war and arguably the most divisive (obviously excluding the Civil War), the effects of Vietnam warrant consideration. Stanley Karnow chronicles a portion of the impact in his 1983 book *Vietnam: A History: The First Complete Account of Vietnam at War.*

> Perhaps the turmoil that convulsed the nation during the war left Americans too exhausted to embark on a quest for blame. Or perhaps the trauma was so profound that they prefer to forget. Yet, as Kissinger says, "Vietnam is still with us. It has created doubts about American judgment, about American credibility, about American power--not only at home, but throughout the world. It has poisoned our domestic debate. So we paid an exorbitant price for the decisions that were made in good faith and for good purpose."[7]

Karnow succinctly describes how the war altered the very fabric of the Army, its order and discipline:

> The US army in Vietnam was a shambles as the war drew to a close in the early 1970's. Antiwar protests at home had by now spread to the men in the field, many of whom wore peace symbols and refused to go into combat. Race relations, which were good when blacks and whites had earlier shared a sense of purpose, became increasingly brittle. The use of drugs was so widespread that, according to an official estimate made in 1971, nearly one third of the troops were addicted to opium or heroin, and marijuana smoking had become routine. Soldiers not only disobeyed their superiors but, in an alarming number of incidents, actually murdered them with fragmentation grenades--a practice dubbed "fragging." An ugly scandal surfaced after officers and noncoms were arraigned for reaping personal profits from service clubs and post exchanges. Morale also deteriorated following revelations of a massacre in which a US infantry company slaughtered more than three hundred Vietnamese inhabitants of

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Mylai village in cold blood--an episode that prompted GIs to assume that their commanders were covering up other atrocities.[8]

The upheaval and disillusionment spawned by this war cannot be overstated. The war's unpopularity also contributed to the advent of the all-volunteer force. The majors in this survey served as the platoon leaders of the first generation of volunteer soldiers. Karnow also argues that the war hurt the quality of the officers under whom the majors in this survey served at the beginning of their service:

> Richard Nixon ended an inequitable and unpopular draft in order to curry favor with voters. Volunteers were also attracted from among the underprivileged and undereducated -- young men often least qualified to handle a modern army's sophisticated technology. Hostility to the war had damaged university and college reserve officer training programs, whose enrollments dropped precipitously from more than two hundred thousand in 1968 to some seventy-five thousand by 1973. An important source of bright, innovative, open-minded leadership narrowed, leaving much of the army's management to superannuated bureaucrats.[9]

In spite of the ultimate strategic failure in Vietnam and of the suggested loss of innovative and open-minded leadership, there are some very positive consequences, largely attributable to the unfavorable termination of that war. The recognition that a clear and militarily attainable end-state is necessary, prior to the employment of the military instrument of power is one positive outcome. As a result of the senior leadership's Vietnam experience, this mind-set is inculcated in the majority of today's field grade officers. Certainly, when weighing the military options available, current midgrade officers have inherited some of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Colin Powell's concerns:

> This relationship of influence to perceived operational success or failure may cause the military to become timid in its recommendations to national policymakers. For instance, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor suggest that Colin Powell's highly cautious approach to the use of American military power reflected his fear "that American public opinion could turn against the armed forces, as it did during the Vietnam War."[10]

Eliot A. Cohen, in a study presented at the US Army War College, cited StephenRosenfeld of *The Washington Post* regarding doctrine. Shortly after the Gulf War,

Rosenfeld wrote an article praising the role played by doctrine in the Gulf War. He contended that:

> What the military appears to like most about military doctrine is that it's military. It's not something drafted by "intellectual theoreticians" and imposed by politicians for political purposes, such as applying pressure to force a compromise solution, as in Vietnam. It's designed by military people for the unambiguously military purpose of fighting and winning a war.[11]

The army's Airland Battle doctrine, developed shortly after this Vietnam period, was formally published in the 1982 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*. It was envisioned, developed, and implemented primarily for the European Warsaw Pact scenario. That version, and even much of the present doctrine, is certainly in some measure a by-product of the Vietnam experience. Today's doctrine and organizational mind-set are perhaps the mechanisms by which the senior leadership has most influenced the thoughts of the midgrade officer. Although operations in Vietnam covered the entire operational spectrum, the fact that there existed little OOTW doctrine between Vietnam and the present decade may be indicative of the underlying mistrust with which the prevailing leaders held for this confusing military role. (A watershed year for OOTW's modern incarnation was 1986.)[12]

Operation Power Pack (Dominican Republic), 1965-1966

In 1965, the US was experiencing difficulties in the Panama Canal Zone with Panamanian opposition to the US presence and simultaneously trying to enlist other "free world" nations to assist the 69,200 US troops engaged in Vietnam.[13] On 24 April 1965, the US was asked to intervene in a coup taking place in the Dominican Republic. President Lyndon Johnson, in knowing violation of the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), ordered US Marines and the 82d Airborne Division to deploy. He explained, "I will not have another Cuba in the Caribbean."[14]

At the height of the intervention, nearly 24,000 US troops were committed to the joint and, ultimately, combined operation. For US soldiers in the Dominican Republic, actual combat occupied only a small portion of their time. Once it became apparent that the intervention of the marines and paratroopers precluded a rebel victory, US forces became engaged in a variety of civic action, PSYWAR, civil affairs, and other noncombat activities, the principal purposes of which were to restore stability, "win hearts and minds," and provide the foundation for a negotiated settlement.[15]

For the combat soldier, the most visible manifestation of this decision was an avalanche of rules of engagement, many of which placed severe restrictions on US military behavior in the Dominican Republic. The Johnson administration, despite domestic and international criticism of US behavior in the crisis, regarded the intervention a success because order had been restored, the electoral process resuscitated, and a Communist takeover averted.[16]

Operation Eagle Claw (Iran Hostage Rescue) 1980

In brief, this aborted interservice commando raid to free American hostages being held in Iran highlighted the US military's inability to launch a complex, joint special operation. This prominent failure of America's military forces, coupled with the still fresh Vietnam failure, set the stage for the "Reagan buildup" of the 1980s. The failure of this mission underscored the need for an integrated, equipped, and standing special operations force (SOF). This need spawned the US Army's Task Force 160, later designated the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), and the standing unified headquarters the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).[17]

Lebanon, 1982-1983

In September 1982, the US Multinational Force (USMNF) under the terms of an international agreement, went to Beirut to assist in the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the

Palestine Liberation Army. The mission enjoyed the consent of all concerned and was successful. The US Marines returned to their ships and resumed their duties afloat. A few weeks later, the Lebanon government asked them to return to help control growing internal disorder. The situation had deteriorated to the point that the Beirut government had little more legitimacy than any other competing faction.

The next time the Marines landed, they lacked the consensus of all parties. By October 1983, the USMNF was attempting to balance the requirements of two contradictory missions: to maintain a neutral peacekeeping presence and to provide overt support to the Lebanese armed forces.[18] They ultimately became a party to the conflict through de facto alliance with the Lebanese government. Although the details remain controversial, it appears that the Marines were disposed in a manner consistent with consensual peacekeeping, but inappropriate for participants in a conflict. Their command post presented an attractive target for antigovernment factions who attacked it with a truck bomb, killing more than 200 Marines.[19]

El Salvador, 1980-1992

The concern for another Cuba or Soviet-proxy state in America's backyard caused concern for the Reagan administration. In spite of congressional concerns of another Vietnam. Reagan increased the number of advisers from an original 20 to 54.[20] Though only fifty-five US military advisers were serving there in early 1983, American regulations tightly circumscribed their activities in order to avoid incident that might exacerbate apprehensions at home. The rules barred them from participating in Salvadoran army operations or even from carrying weapons larger than a revolver--and, in February 1983, three American officers discovered on a combat mission were unceremoniously relieved of their duties.[21]

Opinion surveys in 1983 divulged that 59 percent of Americans opposed the presence of military advisers in El Salvador and that 72 percent disapproved of an increase in US military

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aid to the Salvadoran government.[22] The US commitment to El Salvador perhaps best displays the OOTW doctrinal principle of *perseverance*. By 1990, with the conflict in its tenth year, El Salvador lost its US media appeal. With the war virtually stalemated, the number of exploitable news events declined.[23]

According to Lieutenant Colonel Victor M. Rosello the El Salvador experience generally validated the US Army's foreign internal defense doctrine in countering insurgency: El Salvador demonstrated the merits of relegating US involvement to a strictly supporting role.[24] This success came at a cost. Rosello reports there were about 10,000 El Salvadoran dead, 25,000 wounded, and 7,000 permanently disabled and a $6 billion price tag for the US. Ironically, this is perhaps America's most successful counterinsurgency operation to date.

Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada), 1983

A British possession until 1974, Grenada's fledgling government was overthrown in a Marxist coup in 1979. Within two years, Grenada was becoming a virtual satellite of Cuba, with the support of a 300-man contingent of Cuban military personnel.[25] In October 1983, the US launched a contingency operation into the island nation, ostensibly to protect the lives of American students attending a medical college there.

The US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) formed two joint task forces (JTF) for this operation. JTF 123 combined Navy and Army special operations forces. JTF 120 consisted of a Navy task group, a Navy task force composed primarily of a Marine amphibious unit, and an Army task force composed of two brigades from the 82d Airborne Division. The operation was spearheaded by the 25 October parachute assault of the two US Ranger battalions and the amphibious landing of a US Marine amphibious unit (MAU). Although largely successful, the operation spotlighted many interoperability and command and control problems.

Within three years, largely because of this operation, a third ranger battalion would be established, the 75th Ranger Regiment reactivated, and the milestone military reform law the Goldwater-Nichols Act passed. This act and subsequent amendments established the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) and the National Security Council's LIC Board.[26]

Operation Hawkeye (Hurricane Hugo), September 1989

The following is a brief description of the events that faced a task force of predominately XVIII Airborne Corps soldiers as recorded by Colonel Patrick Finnegan in *Military Review's* March-April 1996 edition.

> After Hurricane Hugo devastated parts of the US Virgin Islands, there was widespread looting and chaos on St. Croix. The situation was beyond local police control--the Virgin Islands National Guard was, at best, a nonentity and, at worst, a participant in the breakdown of law and order. Although the governor of the islands initially resisted using federal troops, President George Bush ordered the XVIII Airborne Corps and other units to St. Croix to quell civil disturbances. The hurricane had virtually destroyed the federal prison, allowing 500 convicted felons to roam free and add to the chaos on the island.
> The mission focus changed quickly from civil disturbance to disaster relief operation (DRO). By the time the corps TF arrived, the looting had ended. Our main focus became protecting the few businesses that were still operational, guarding the condominiums and resort hotels and helping the government organize and control DRO and distribute food and water. The local government, reeling from the hurricane's effects, had no plans for dealing with such a crisis and could not communicate with the populace because all radio stations and telephone lines were destroyed by the storm. Operation Hawkeye marked the first time in more than 20 years that US troops were ordered to perform civil disturbance operations. Hawkeye also was the corps' first major DRO experience.[27]

Two New Models for Success

The present self-image of midgrade officers, and the US Army is largely shaped by two comparatively recent and successful military operations, Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Not withstanding the recent aggression of Saddam Hussein against the Kurds in Northern Iraq and the questions surrounding chemical weapons exposure of US troops deployed in the Gulf, the Persian Gulf War was a dramatic display of US military technology and capabilities.

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The swift and decisive execution of these two military forays produced wide-spread and popular support, both internationally and on the homefront.

Forty-two percent of the respondents to the survey in this research participated in at least one of these two operations.

Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty (Panama) 1989-1990

Operation Just Cause began in the early morning hours of 20 December 1989. The Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, JTF Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation Just Cause. By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and for launching immediate assaults against the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF).[28]

Forward-deployed forces (including US Army South (USARSO), an assortment of US SOF and elements from the 82d Airborne Division, the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 7th Infantry Division (Light), and US Marines Corps and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets--most of them in the vicinity of the former Panama Canal Zone against key PDF strongholds. The JTF commander employed land and special operations forces to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets.[29]

During Operation Just Cause, the armed forces of the United States rapidly assembled, deployed, and conducted an opposed entry operation. The well-tailored force involved in this operation simultaneously seized multiple key targets in Panama, virtually eliminating organized resistance in the space of a few hours. The operation demonstrated the capability of the US military to project forces rapidly against opposition while synchronizing multiple elements of combat power.[30]

In spite of the euphoria surrounding the rapid tactical successes achieved by the employment of overwhelming combat power, the Panama situation was not solved. Dr. John T. Fishel summarizes the termination of Just Cause in a 1992 study as follows:

> Operation Promote Liberty, the civil-military restoration operation conducted concurrently with Operation Just Cause, was an operational success but strategically ambiguous. One reason for this result was that during the development of the combat plan, Blue Spoon, and the civil-military operations (CMO) restoration plan, Blind Logic, there was no clear political objective.[31]

The post-conflict confusion and difficulties not withstanding, Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty are recounted as largely successful militarily and a model for future strike operations.

Operation Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and the Restoration of Kuwait.

On 2 August 1990, more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers invaded Kuwait. Desert Shield began on 7 August when the NCA directed the deployment of US forces in response to Saudi Arabia's request for assistance. The buildup of forces was initially to halt Iraqi aggression and defend Saudi Arabia. The force deployment continued until the force was large enough to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The force included the mobilization of 140,000 Army Guardsmen and Reservists--the largest mobilization since World War II.[32]

Desert Storm began on 17 January 1991, when Allied air and naval forces began the destruction of key Iraqi strategic, operational, and tactical targets. By 21 January, the Iraqi air force was incapable of operations. Air operations continued to strike key systems, Republican Guard, and frontline Iraqi forces. USMC forces afloat tied down Iraqi ground forces along the coast with a threatened amphibious landing. SOF operated throughout the theater.

These operations set the stage for the ground war to begin 24 February 1991. Within one-hundred hours, much of the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti theater was destroyed, and the remainder was in flight. On the twenty-eighth of February 1991, President Bush called for coalition forces

to cease offensive operations. Organized resistance ceased, and the allied coalition won a victory of unprecedented dimensions.[33]

The destruction of the Iraqi Army did not end the campaign in the Persian Gulf. Units rapidly began to focus on postconflict activities. Task Force Freedom began operations to restore Kuwait.[34]

> Task Force Freedom was America's organization to assist Kuwait's restoration. Elements under Brigadier General Robert S. Frix, deputy commander of US Army Forces Central Command, were a combined civil affairs task force that planned and coordinated the restoration effort with Kuwait; a support command task force to provide necessary services and logistical support; an aviation brigade and psychological operations battalion; and other essential units.[35]

Task Force Freedom provided invaluable assistance in restoring the Kuwaiti infrastructure and returning a degree of normalcy to the country. Within occupied Iraq, for a period of more than six weeks, US Army forces provided humanitarian assistance, restored order, opened schools, and resettled almost 20,000 Iraqi refugees into Saudi Arabia.[36]

Operation Provide Comfort

Conducted by the European Command, Provide Comfort was a joint and combined post-conflict activity with extensive SOF involvement focused on providing humanitarian relief and protection to the displaced Kurdish population of Iraq. It began with an alert order on 5 April 1991, following an unsuccessful attempt by Kurdish rebels to overthrow the Iraqi government.

The major US army units involved were the 10th Special Forces Group and the 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team (ABCT). They and their coalition partners eventually built 43 Kurdish refugee camps which sheltered more than 500,000 refugees. On 21 May 1991, the combined task force (CTF) reached its peak strength of 21,701 personnel from 13 different nations. By 15 July 1991, the US forces had departed northern Iraq and two days later the CTF deactivated.[37]

Los Angeles (LA) Riots, 1992

The Los Angeles riots of 1992 were unquestionably the most costly civil disturbance in US history ($800 million plus). [38] On 29 April 1992, after the Rodney King verdict, riots erupted from the Hollywood Hills to the Long Beach areas of the Los Angeles metropolitan area. The governor of California requested the dispatch of 2,000 California Guardsmen. The California National Guard was ordered to mobilize shortly after 9:00 p.m. The 40th Infantry Division was alerted, and by the following day an infantry battalion of the division had its companies deployed to their assigned areas.[39] Elements of the now deactivated 2nd Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light) from Fort Ord, and a special purpose US Marine task force of 1,500 marines from the 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, also deployed to Los Angeles to participate in this operation

Recent OOTW Events

I say we are going to have peace even if we have to fight for it.

--*Dwight D. Eisenhower*[40]

Operation Restore Hope and Continue Hope (Somalia), 1992-1994

Operation Restore Hope was a joint task force that deployed about 28,000 personnel from all four armed services to Somalia. President George Bush approved the mission on Thanksgiving Day 1992 and publicly announced his decision on 4 December.[41] Defense Secretary Cheney said the purpose for deploying US forces was to "restore the situation so that relief supplies can be delivered, and so that once we withdraw, we can turn over responsibility for dealing with the continuing security problem to regular UN forces."[42]

Operation Restore Hope established a precedent for military intervention under the auspices of the UN without either an invitation or grounds for individual or collective self-defense. The only justification was human suffering caused by civil (tribal) violence and aggravated by famine and over-population.[43] (Operation Restore Hope covers the deployment

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period from December 1992 to May 1993 during which the mission was largely humanitarian. Operation Continue Hope covers the deployment period from June 1993 onward during which the mission included combat.)[44]

In January 1993, President Clinton and his new administration took office. There began a gradual change from the Bush administration's stated vision. Some characterized it as "mission creep." A mission that initially began as humanitarian assistance transitioned into a hunt for warlords using SOF. According to Henry Franke III,

> Operation Restore Hope has been characterized as the first 'peacemaking' operation in the new world order. Unfortunately, peacemaking is a flawed strategic and military concept that can confuse policy-makers and the public. To attain peace through conflict with conventional forces, you wage war. To establish stability and government control when facing an unconventional threat, you conduct counterinsurgency operations.[45]

As Clinton's first major military operation, there was considerable attention given to this mission. The deviation from the Bush vision was gradual. However, it was the incidents of Task Force Ranger on 3-4 October 1993, resulting in eighteen dead Americans, that brought this change of mission to the forefront. The administration seemed to imply in the press that the SOF forces were under UN control. An article in *Foreign Affairs* stated:

> The truth about the mission and how much it changed is much more complicated. It is not true, as some have charged and the president has implied, that US troops, including the Quick Reaction Force and the Rangers involved in the fatal firefight, were under UN command.[46]

Perhaps the most disturbing issue for many midgrade officers is the perceived lack of candor by the president. A 1994 article summed up sentiment by reporting,

> The Rangers' disastrous firefight in October prompted many--both within the Clinton administration and those outside who had applauded Bush's decision to intervene--to distance themselves from the tragedy by blaming the United Nations. President Clinton, when meeting with families of the dead Rangers, said, somewhat implausibly, that he was surprised the United Nations was still pursuing General Aideed.[47]

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Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti), 1994-Present

In Haiti, the Clinton administration tried to dislodge the junta led by Lieutenant General Cedras by imposing an ever-tighter trade embargo, ultimately cutting off almost all Haitian contact with other countries. The embargo devastated Haiti, destroying its small manufacturing sector and leading to predictions of starvation by the end of 1994. That prospect, combined with the continuing exodus of refugees, the insistence of the Congressional Black Caucus that the elected Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide be restored to power, and a hunger strike protesting the failure to do this by American political activist Randall Robinson, persuaded the administration to use force.[48]

Operation Uphold Democracy was originally planned as a forced-entry, direct-action operation. It was, in many ways, a reiteration of Operation Just Cause. The forced-entry scenario's troop and mission lists bore striking resemblance to Just Cause. Through last minute negotiations between Lieutenant General Cedras and former President Carter, retired former CJCS Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn, an invasion was averted. This deal resulted in the 10th Mountain Division conducting an unopposed landing from the USS Eisenhower, one of the two US Navy aircraft carriers being used as staging platforms for SOF and ground forces. At the peak of the US military intervention in Haiti in October 1994, the US had about 39,000 military personnel deployed in and around Haiti.[49]

Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia), 1995 - Present

The deployment of US troops to Bosnia was a very contentious issue in American politics. On 1 November 1995, congressional leaders went to the White House to inform President Clinton that he had failed to sway lawmakers or the American public on his pledge to deploy 20,000 American troops. In mid-November, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2606, flatly prohibiting the president from spending funds on the Bosnian deployment that were

not specifically appropriated for that purpose--and none were. Ultimately the bill failed in the Senate, but not because the Senate agreed with the president's action.[50]

On 27 November 1995 in a speech to the American public, President Clinton announced his intent to send American forces to Bosnia. In his appeal to the American public President Clinton gave the following rationale for the deployment:

> If we're not there, NATO will not be there. The peace will collapse. The war will reignite. The slaughter of innocents will begin again. A conflict that already has claimed so many victims could spread like a poison throughout the region and eat away at Europe's stability, and erode our partnership with our European allies.[51]

Like the Senate, the American people apparently did not agree with this reasoning. The Associated Press conducted a poll from 29 November to 3 December among a random sample of 1,016 adult Americans. The poll found that 30 percent favored, 57 percent opposed, and 14 percent had no answer when questioned, "Do you favor or oppose sending 20,000 US ground troops to Bosnia as part of a NATO peacekeeping force?"[52] The deployment took place in spite of this opposition.

The original forces for the US component to the Implementation Force (IFOR), Task Force Eagle, were from the 1st Armored Division. This US mission was to be completed within one year. The mission was not completed within the year, so the 1st Infantry Division was tasked to provide an 8,500-man covering force or stabilization force (SFOR) to replace the 1st Armored Division. The SFOR is now committed to staying in Bosnia eighteen months.[53]

According to General Reimer, Operation Joint Endeavor, the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, has provided the Army with a number of lessons that will be vitally important in the future. First and foremost, the IFOR has essentially accomplished the military mission. It has separated the warring designated camps and the concentration of heavy weapons at observable locations, and it has destroyed most field fortifications along the lines of demarcation.[54] The final toll of this operation on the midgrade officer and the Army remains to be seen.

The New World Order?

Collapse of the Soviet Union and Redefining When to Intervene

Michael Mandelbaum, writing in *Foreign Affairs* (January 1996), succinctly summed up the ramifications of this cataclysmic event when he wrote that, "The collapse of the one power capable of sustained and massive hostilities against the United States and the eruption of numerous local conflicts in and around the borders of the former communist world have produced a new set of attitudes and questions about intervention."[55] He argues that the elimination of the Soviet threat removed the basis for linking various local disputes to US interests. It also makes it difficult to obtain a politically reliable domestic consensus for anything more than providing immediate humanitarian relief.

For the midgrade officer, the politics of any given operation may not be the most important aspect of the operation; however, it is probably useful if the deploying force can believe that the mission is being undertaken because national interests are involved. As Mandelbaum aptly summarizes:

> There has never been a formula for deciding on military intervention, and Cold War presidents had to make that decision with the specter of nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union hovering in the background, an experience the Clinton administration was spared. But if the decision to intervene was not easier during the Cold War, it was simpler: US presidents did not necessarily know when to use force, but they always knew why--to combat the Soviet Union, its allies, and its clients, and thus defend American interests. The argument for intervention was not always universally persuasive, but it was always plausible. In Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti in 1993 it was not even plausible.[56]

Global Politics and the United Nations

The man who loves other countries as much as his own stands on a level with the man who loves other women as much as he loves his own wife.[57]

--Theodore Roosevelt

The United Nations

The midgrade officer has seen the best and worst of the UN during his tenure. In 1945, fifty-one nations signed the UN Charter. By the late 1960s, UN membership more than doubled. On 15 December 1994, the UN admitted the Western Pacific island chain of Palau as its 185th member.[58] Less tension exists today among the major powers, and there is a general desire for the UN to handle international threats. Perceived UN successes from 1987 to 1991 reinforce this. During those years, the Iran-Iraq War was mediated, the UN was involved with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, a broad coalition government was established in Cambodia, and the civil war in El Salvador was ended.[59]

The command and control of US forces when involved in UN operations is the subject of much discussion and debate. The command issue is compounded by a concern that the UN is ascending in power and authority. The recent US objections to the reelection of Bhoutros-Ghali also highlighted the divergence of US vice UN interests. The increasing frequency of involvement of the UN is also a question. From 1988 to the present, twenty additional UN peacekeeping operations were initiated adding to the thirteen already underway. At the beginning of 1994, seventeen UN operations, involving 70,000 to 90,000 troops, observers and police, were still ongoing.[60]

The Constitutional Question and the Specialist Michael New Case

Some dedicated soldiers (including midgrade officers) of good conscience do not share the then UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright's opinion that she expressed when she said, "You know there are now 27 nations serving in Somalia, and it's a matter of great pride, I think, as you walk around and see those soldiers in their own uniforms with the UN patch on one arm and their flag on the other."[61]

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Specialist Michael New, a medic with 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, is one of those soldiers who does not share Albright's "pride." A Spring 1996 article in *World Affairs* summarized the New case:

> Most recently, Michael New, a deeply religious soldier with the 3rd Infantry Division in Germany, was informed that his unit was to be deployed to Macedonia as part of the UN force. When he was told that he was required to wear the UN blue beret/helmet and the UN armband, he was reluctant to give up his American army uniform to a foreign organization— one that acknowledges no God and for which all rights are derived from the United Nations. His oath was to defend the United States Constitution—"so help me God." He is now threatened with court martial and imprisonment for refusing to wear the uniform of an ungodly organization and refusing to take the oath that is in conflict with his oath to the United States. [62]

In refusing the order to wear the UN blue beret and the UN flag patch on his shoulder, New summed up his feelings tersely, "I signed up for the green team, not the blue team."[63] Those sentiments are shared by many GIs. As fellow medic Specialist Alfredo Maritz said, "I think a lot of people feel the same way he does, but they don't have the guts to say it."[64]

In a January 1996 article in *Veterans of Foreign Wars* magazine, Dale Van Atta reported that New launched his legal challenge to the order placing him under a foreign officer in Macedonia, a former Yugoslav republic, with the statement: "Sir, I took an oath to the Constitution of the United States of America. I cannot find any reference to the United Nations in my oath or in the Constitution I have sworn to defend."[65] Further compounding the irony of the case, the UN undersecretary general in charge of peacekeeping operations in the Balkans is an Iraqi.[66]

Gays in the Military

Another volatile issue that the Clinton administration raised of concern to midgrade officers was the administration's efforts to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the military. Although this initial desire was thwarted by public opinion and senior officers, the military did revise its policy. An *Army Times*, October 1993, article reported that the suspension of

administrative actions adds yet another twist to the changes in military policy on homosexuals that have occurred since President Clinton took office. "Service members and the unit commanders responsible for carrying out our policy have every right to feel confused," said a senior defense official. "We are jerking people around."[67]

Economic and Funding Issues

Funding is a very real issue for the midgrade officer. Resources drive everything from training to the procurement of hardware, and ultimately combat readiness. The cost of US participation in peacekeeping is soaring: about $3.7 billion for fiscal year 1995.[68] At $1.82 billion the Department of Defense incurred the brunt of this expenditure. The army's share was $562.8 million. While this is still a small portion of world and national defense expenditures, it is not negligible. Costs have risen, not only because the number of peace operations has risen more in the last four years than the previous forty but also because the military environment has become much more demanding.[69]

Paradoxically, for Americans the percentage of resources dedicated to military readiness continues to decline. In 1950, there were 3.9 soldiers per 1,000 citizens: by 1 October 1996, there will be 1.9 soldiers per 1,000 citizens. In 1950, the budget was 1.5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP): by 1 October 1996, it will be .8 percent.[70] Regrettably, this declining percentage must be used to defray the increasing costs associated with OOTW.

The Army Drawdown

Although the midgrade officers in the Army now have survived the drawdown from 780,000 soldiers to 491,000, it produced many institutional pressures and anxiety. Not only has the post-cold war demobilization been particularly difficult for the Army because of the leadership and management problems posed by letting a quarter of a million soldiers go, but also during

most of the cold war, the Army defined itself by its ability to fight a very particular kind of war (intense, mechanized battles), at a particular place (on the plains of central Europe), and in a particular manner (as part of a well-defined, long-standing international alliance). That core mission and with it a way of life has disappeared for good.[71]

General Reimer, in a June 1995 speech regarding the drawdown and its attendant stress explained that,

> We had to do some extraordinary things to make the year groups come out right and shape the Army properly for the future. That was not easy. I would agree there is increased stress throughout the Army, which is tied to the uncertainty of the future: 'Where is it we are going to end up?' The stress is also tied to the increase in operational pace and to zero defects thinking.[72]

Undoubtedly, the increasing tempo of operations is effecting the midgrade officer. General George A. Joulwan, commander in chief of US European Command and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, stated on 7 October 1993 that, "It is increasingly difficult to keep up the morale and readiness of US forces in Europe."[73] He is worried that increased military involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions could sap combat expertise from the military. "We must not lose sight of the fact that the first training priority of our armed forces must be warfighting,"[74]

Quality of Life and PERSTEMPO

If an army has been deprived of its morale, its general will also lose his heart.[75]

Sun Tzu

Midgrade officers are very likely to have families. As of 1995, eighty percent of the male officers were married, 58 percent of the female officers. Overall, 53 percent of the officers have children, with an average of 1.9 children for those who do have children. General Reimer, in the September-October 1995 *Military Review*, addressed the stress and turmoil:

Our missions have expanded, and we not only have the traditional mission of providing regional security and stability, but we have also picked up additional missions you are very familiar with, such as Haiti, Guantanamo Bay, Macedonia, Somalia and Rwanda, just to name a few. In fact, there are about 20,000 soldiers deployed away from home station on a daily basis. Our soldiers spend an average of 138 days a year deployed away from home station. That is a lot of turbulence. It is a lot of moving out and picking up your rucksack and going for it. There has been a 300 percent increase in our operational deployments overseas-and that is important.[76]

This pace, with its associated familial and social costs, is a factor for many midgrade officers. The individual officer must contemplate the impact of this lifestyle on the well being and health of his family as he makes career decisions. The prospects for the future do not seem much brighter. General Reimer went on to say:

I think we have to live with operational deployments. That is the environment we face right now--it is the environment all of us live in, and it is an environment, I think, you are going to live in the rest of your Army career. I do not see this changing dramatically anytime soon.[77]

Awards

The realization that soldiers are motivated by awards is a long-standing one, and recognized by military forces around the world. Napoleon purportedly said, "that he could make men die for little pieces of ribbon." The awards associated with a given operation undoubtedly influence the positive or negative impact that a given operation has on the soldier for many logical reasons.

Awards are valued by the individual on at least three levels. First, the more traditional reason, is for the esprit and morale of the recipient and corresponding admiration and esteem they generate among others. Second, at the tangible level, is for the potential monetary value, one example being the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal (AFEM). Receipt of this award gives the veteran preferential treatment in the federal government's hiring process. The third level awards are valued on, and perhaps the most important, is for the perceived benefits these awards hold within the military promotion process.

Awards are generally thought to have a favorable influence on promotion (and other selection) board outcomes. These boards view the individual's awards in two of the three components of the officer's file. First, they are seen in the individual's Department of the Army (DA) photograph in Class A uniform which is worn with all authorized awards and decorations. Secondly, is the officer's record brief (ORB). The ORB has a specific section that lists all of the awards that the officer has earned.

For participating in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, soldiers received, at minimum, the AFEM and the authorization to wear the former wartime shoulder sleeve insignia (SSI) or combat patch. Select eligible soldiers were also awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge (CIB) or Combat Medic Badge (CMB). As reported in the *Army Times* in October 1993:

> The Army has further recognized the rugged challenges of an assignment to Somalia by approving the award of its most prestigious badge and combat medals to soldiers serving in that East African nation. Under a policy directive signed Oct. 8, Gen. Gordon Sullivan, chief of staff, authorized the senior Army commander in Somalia to award the Combat Infantryman Badge, or CIB. The directive follows by three months another Sullivan decision that authorized combat patches for soldiers in Somalia. The Army describes the CIB "as its most prestigious and coveted badge." When worn on the uniform, it is displayed above all other decorations.[78]

For Operation Joint Endeavor, soldiers received the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) medal and a recently created "OOTW medal." The April 1996 *Soldier Magazine* provided an explanation of the new medal:

> The Defense Department recently announced authorization of the Armed Forces Service Medal. The new decoration recognizes service members who participated--on or after June 1, 1992--as members of US military units in a US military operation in which personnel of any armed force participated and that was deemed to be a "significant activity." However, the unit must not have faced foreign armed opposition or the threat of imminent hostile action, DOD officials said. In order of precedence, the new medal comes immediately before the Humanitarian Service Medal. The AFSM is to be awarded only for operations for which no other US service medal has been approved.[79]

For Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, soldiers received the Humanitarian Service Medal (HSM) and the AFEM but did not receive the SSI for former wartime service or combat

patch. For participating in the multinational force observers (MFO), there is a specific MFO ribbon that is awarded to each participant.

Motivations for Joining and the Warrior Ethos

When most of today's midgrade officers joined the Army, the Army was enjoying the renewed vigor of the Reagan buildup and the very real (although sometimes romanticized) prospect of being a formidable and globally respected warfighting force. A 1996 *World Affairs* article raises concerns about why soldiers join (and arguably why midgrade officers remain in service):

> American youths join the US military to defend our country, not to fight and die to establish some new world order. The American Defense Institute warned that President Clinton has expanded the definition of threat to international peace and security to include a sudden and unexpected interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights.[80]

In a 1993 article in the *Army Times*, Major William E. Bailey expressed concern about the army's new direction:

> To attempt to turn the US military into some sort of big brother, peace corps, humanitarian assistance, job corps, halfway house, touchy-feely Vision Quest defeats the purpose for which it was created. Naturally, the military is partly to blame. We have for years tried to lure teen-agers into the military by promising "it's a great place to start" and "from high school to flight school," among other recruiting slogans. The truth about the military is that we want your high school son or daughter so we can teach them the best and most efficient way to kill the enemy, which is, after all, the ultimate goal of any army.[81]

Declining Benefits

> *A man who is good enough to shed his blood for his country is good enough to be given a square deal afterwards. More than that no man is entitled to, and less than that no man shall have.* [82]
>
> —*Theodore Roosevelt*

As General Reimer aptly stated, soldiers "look at how we treat our retirees and they make career decisions on that."[83] That would include the midgrade officer also, as one observer noted:

If we aren't treated fairly and we can't live with our retirement, having spent the better part of our lives invested in your country asked you to do, then it's going to have a tremendous bearing on recruiting eventually.[84]

Commenting on the outlook for retaining promised benefits James Pennington wrote in

the *Army Times*, November 1996:

For over 220 years, US military forces have defended this nation. In return, our government promised them lifetime medical care, adequate pay and compensation and other quality-of-life necessities. The battle to maintain a strong national defense and save promised, earned military benefits becomes increasingly difficult. Today, only about one-third of the members of Congress and 10 percent of their staffs have any personal military experience. These numbers decrease with each election. A similar situation exists in the administration. If the government's promises are not kept, our volunteer force will not survive, and our strong national defense will be destroyed.[85]

Based on the projected shortfalls in retention and recruiting for fiscal year 1997, that day may

have arrived for the enlisted ranks. Where the breaking point is for the midgrade officer remains

to be determined.

The Research Question

The primary thesis question this study addresses is: What is the impact of OOTW on the

midgrade (O-3/4) US Army officer? Subordinate questions this study also addresses are: How

does OOTW effect the midgrade officer's: (1) Attitudes on training requirements for the OOTW

role? (2) Attitudes and opinions on combat readiness when used in this role? (3) Attitudes and

opinions on the appropriateness of specific OOTW roles and missions? and, (4) Attitudes towards

continued service in the US Army?

Assumptions

This study assumes that the increase in OOTW mission frequency has had a measurable

impact on the midgrade Army officer. This study also assumes that the professional Army officer

will provide thoughtful and honest responses to the questionnaire and that this instrument is valid

and reliable. The third assumption is that the target population for the study (Division B, CGSOC

academic year 1996-97) is a valid representation of the total population of midgrade officers throughout the Army.

Definitions

Doctrinal or official definitions are provided whenever possible. The source follows the definition. In cases where the common usage deviates from the "book" definition or service/joint terms differ, additional explanation is given.

Disaster Relief. No specific definition is given in any joint or service publications although the army does have a specific regulation on this subject (AR 500-60, *Disaster Relief*, August 1981). Joint publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, May 1995 does recognize it as a distinct mission in the following:

> The use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands. These operations include humanitarian assistance, *disaster relief*, some nation assistance, foreign internal defense, most support to counterdrug operations, arms control, support to US civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants in a permissive environment, and peacekeeping.[86]

Humanitarian Assistance. Defined by FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, December 1994 as:

> Assistance provided by DOD forces, as directed by appropriate authority, in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property; assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration and is designed to supplement efforts of civilian authorities who have primary responsibility for providing such assistance.[87]

The joint definition further lists other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation. (Joint Publication 1-02) *Humanitarian assistance* is not included in the definition of peace operations; however HA programs will probably be conducted simultaneously in almost every peace operation. Normally limited in their scope and duration, HA projects have a significant impact on resources required and other aspects of peace operations.[88]

Midgrade Army Officer. The definition for this study is an active component, promotable captain (O-3), major (O-4) or lieutenant colonel (O-5). This definition is irrespective of branch and gender and includes army competitive category and specialty officers (JAG, AMEDD, Chaplains, etc.

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Defined by Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, May 1995 as:

> Military operations other than war encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW.[89]

Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Defined in FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, December 1994 as, "Military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces."[90] Note: the joint term for OOTW is "military operations other than war."

Peace Operations. Defined in FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, December 1994 as,

> An umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two complementary, predominately military, activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement).

The joint definition (approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Publication 1-02) from Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, May 1995 states it, "Encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.[91]

The three following definitions are from FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, December 1994:

> Peace-enforcement. The application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.[92]

> Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to the dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, etc.) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.[93]

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Peacemaking. A process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges ends to disputes and resolves issues that led to conflict.[94]

Limitations

Limitations on the questions that could be asked of the survey respondents will limit the understanding of this topic. The Command and General Staff College Development Assessment Division would not allow the respondents to be asked their marital status, religious beliefs, or political affiliation. These variables might be more relevant in understanding attitudes towards OOTW than those measured in this study, e.g., branch, type of operation, etc.

Another potential shortcoming of this study is the limited population that is sampled. The sample size is large enough to be representative of the Command and General Staff Officers College academic year 1997 class, but further conclusions may be unreliable.

Delimitations

The survey instrument is necessarily brief. Questions are predominately closed-ended, both for the ease of the respondents and for simplification of data compilation and computation. The target population was given only twelve calendar days to complete the survey (24 January - 5 February 1997). During this same period, the division B students were in C-320 (Tactics), a fairly time-consuming class.

To limit the length of the survey numerous questions were not asked that would have given increased understanding of attitudes towards OOTW. Topics not asked include:

1. What individual awards did you receive for your participation in the given OOTW?

2. What relative deprivation did you face (living conditions, food, etc.) during your participation in the given OOTW?

3. What morale support activities, mail, telephone calls were available during your participation in the given OOTW?

4. What individual life events took place (e.g. birth of a child, divorce, death of a family member) during your participation in the given OOTW?

5. What combat action and intensity did you face during your participation in the given OOTW?

6. What was your physical health during your participation in the given OOTW?

7. What was the general public's perception of the OOTW you participated in?

Significance of the Study

Most of the midgrade officers in this survey will return to the field shortly. Their attitudes are, at least in part, representative of the attitudes of their brethren currently serving in operational units. As battalion and brigade operations officers, battalion executive officers, division plans or training officers, to name a few positions, they are the primary trainers and planners for combat units. How they plan, train, and allocate resources towards the execution of these OOTW missions will have a dramatic influence on the US Army.

The transition from a bipolar world to the new world order, which includes increasing subnational, regional, and tribal conflict, in conditions that lack any viable political entity with its normally associated services, has created predicaments with an ever increasing frequency, that are too complex to be resolved with the military force as it currently is structured. This research may suggest that this void may ultimately require a separate or constabulary branch of the armed forces. One goal of this paper is to determine what costs are incurred by using (or misusing) the US Army to perform the OOTW in the interim.

Furthermore, the role of peacekeeper or disaster relief provider may not be gratifying nor challenging to the type of officer that is best suited for combat operations (arguably the reason the Army exists). The Army's adoption of this OOTW role may result in a clash between the ethos associated with this more frequently occurring role (at least in terms of a doctrinal and institutional acceptance) and the traditional war-fighting role. This clash might well lead to the destruction of the very institution the leaders desire to preserve. This study seeks to understand the midgrade officer's perceptions.

It is difficult to determine the degree to which these attitudes are significant. The fact that the US Army is used in OOTW may often be a politically expedient decision that does not bear the potential ramifications of using a traditional application of military force. This may mean that objectives are not militarily defined, but instead, are based upon time or other undefined or open-ended criteria. This could cause the military to feel they are political pawns and not instruments of military power. According to many military scholars, the likelihood of these OOTW deployments only increases in the future. This study seeks to understand the midgrade officer's attitudes on this increased frequency.

To neglect understanding the consequences that these OOTW operations have upon US forces is foolishness at best and potentially deadly at worst.

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[1]"The fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces must remain to fight and win our Nation's wars whenever and wherever called upon." Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John M. Shalikashvili. Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, January 1995), Foreword.

[2]Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Translated by J.J. Graham, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968): 288.

[3]Robert J. Bunker, "Rethinking OOTW," *Military Review* LVVV (6), (November-December 1995): 53.

[4]Ibid.

[5] Paul A. Gade, "Military Service and the Life-Course Perspective: A Turning Point for Military Personnel Research," *Military Psychology*, 3 (4) (1991): 191.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Stanley Karnow. *Vietnam: A History: The First Complete Account of Vietnam at War* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1983): 21.

[8] Ibid., 23-24.

[9] Ibid., 24.

[10] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf,* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995): viii.

[11] Stephen Rosenfeld, "Military Doctrine Today," *The Washington Post*, (March 22, 1991): A25.

[12] John B. Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," *Military Review*, LXXVI (5) (September-October 1996): 4.

[13] Kenneth Anderson, *US Military Operations 1945-1985*, (New York: Military Press, 1984): 154.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Lawrence A. Yates. "Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966," *Leavenworth Papers*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS., Number 15), Synopsis.

[16] Ibid.

[17] United Special Special Operations Command, "Joint Special Operations Command" *United Special Operations Command 1996 Posture Statement*, (Government Printing Office, undated): 42.

[18] Major Daniel J. Schuster, "Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and the Operational Art." Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, (Fort Leavenworth, KS., 1995): 10.

[19] John B. Hunt. "Thoughts on Peace Support Operations," *Military Review*. LXXIV (5) (September-October 1994): 77.

[20] Anderson, *US Military Operations 1945-1985*: 176.

[21] Karnow, *Vietnam: A History:*, 22.

[22] Ibid., 22-23.

[23] Victor M. Rosello, "Lessons from El Salvador," *Parameters*, (Winter 1993-94): 102.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Anderson, *US Military Operations 1945-1985*: 182.

[26]Hunt. "OOTW: A Concept in Flux." 4.

[27]Colonel Patrick Finnegan, US Army. "Operational Law: Plan and Execute," *Military Review* LXXVI (2) (March-April 1996): 29-31.

[28]Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 February 1995): 97.

[29]Ibid.

[30]US Army FM 100-5, *Operations*, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June 1993): 3-1.

[31]John T. Fishel, "The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 15 April 1992): vii

[32]FM 100-5, 3-2.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid.

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Categorizing the Literature

Although much is written about OOTW and the problems associated with successfully

employing this evolving doctrine, little has been published concerning its impact upon the soldier

and even less regarding the midgrade officer in particular. This review recognizes works that

explain or define the OOTW environment and the sociopsychological studies that have analyzed

effects upon the soldiers involved in OOTW.

This review divides the literature into three categories. The first category is authoritative

or doctrinal publications of an official nature, e.g., joint publications, field manuals, Government

Accounting Office, and Congressional reports. The second category is the current literature in

(and from) the field, such as military-academic publications (e.g., *Military Review* and *Armed*

Forces Quarterly); academic journals and publications (e.g., *Armed Forces and Society*); and

scholarly works, such as monographs and strategic studies. The third and perhaps most important

category to this research is those previously conducted research studies that have direct application

and relevance to this theses.

Authoritative and Doctrinal Publications

Recent OOTW Doctrine History

John B. Hunt in his 1996 article "OOTW: A Concept in Flux" in *Military Review*

provides a brief historical background on OOTW doctrine:

The OOTW concept--and the part of it formerly called LIC--has been well known within the military profession for at least 30 years, and a variety of literature about it is available. However, just as the Army would not accept the OOTW concept in Vietnam, the institutional Army is not eager to embrace it now. It is easier for the Army to continue in familiar ways, no matter what missions it is actually performing and whether or not current operating methods bring success.[1]

In the same article he provides his view of the current status of OOTW doctrine:

After many delays, FM 100-20, now titled Stability and Support Operations, seems to be well on its way to publication. JP 3-07 contains a correct, albeit shallow, explanation of what OOTW is all about and is a good companion to the new FM 100-20. The new FM 100-20 amplifies and explains OOTW in ways the joint publications do not. It provides the depth of understanding necessary for successful mission analysis, planning and execution and explains the nature of peace and conflict environments, national purpose and use of military force in OOTW.[2]

While these doctrinal publications may provide more insight into the how and why in conducting OOTW operations, they provide few insights into the effects these operations have on the forces involved. The publications acknowledge the substantial differences between OOTW and warfighting but fall short of addressing the impact on the soldier. The following are selected excerpts where these issues are addressed:

Joint Pub 3.07 *Military Operations Other Than War*

Published in 1995, this manual recognizes the differences in the training focus and the requirement for retraining after deployment for a peace operation. In terms of preparation:

Peacekeeping requires an adjustment of attitude and approach by the individual to a set of circumstances different from those normally found on the field of battle--an adjustment to suit the needs of a peaceable intervention rather than of an enforcement action. On the other hand, many facets of normal military training apply to peacekeeping operations.[3]

Regarding redeployment the publication advises that:

Planners should schedule redeployment of specific units as soon as possible after their part in the operation has been completed. This is critical for maintaining readiness for supporting units with which it normally deploys, and if possible, with the next higher headquarters for the actual operation. Once deployed, and if the situation allows, military skills training at individual and unit level may occur. Training following redeployment should again focus on the unit's wartime mission.[4]

<u>Joint Pub 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*</u>

In explaining considerations for predeployment training, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, published in 1994, advises that, "To accomplish peacekeeping, individuals and units need training in various skills and techniques before deployment to change their focus from combat-warriors to soldiers who use force only in self-defense."[5]

In addressing post-peacekeeping mission training, the publication advises that, "at the conclusion of the peacekeeping mission, certain actions are necessary to return the individual to a combat-oriented mind set." It also cautions that:

> Unit commanders must allow sufficient time after a peacekeeping mission for refresher training and for redeveloping skills and abilities that have unavoidably been affected by the nature of any PKO. This will require a training program to hone skills necessary to return the unit to combat ready status.[6]

<u>US Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*</u>

The preface to US Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, 1994, advises that the manual provides guidance for the full range of peace operations and serves as the foundation for further development of US Army tactics, techniques, and procedures. Regarding the nature of peace operations the manual explains:

> Peace operations often require special consideration of soldier health, welfare, and morale factors. These operations frequently involve deployment to an austere, immature theater with limited life support systems. In addition, peace operations place unique demands, such as periods of possible boredom while manning observation posts or checkpoints, on soldiers. Soldiers must deal with these stresses while under the constant scrutiny of the world press. Commanders must consider these factors when assigning missions and planning rotations of units into and within the theater.[7]

In Appendix C (Training), the manual provides guidance regarding the post-operations actions that should be taken:

> Peace operations require a significant change in orientation for military personnel. Before the peace operations mission, training is provided to transition the wartime-ready individual to one constrained in most, if not all, actions. At the conclusion of the peace operation, certain

actions are necessary to reorient the soldier to the unit's wartime mission essential task list (METL). Commanders must allocate sufficient resources and time for training in order to achieve collective and individual standards required to meet the unit's primary warfighting mission.[8]

GAO Congressional Report on PERSTEMPO

The National Security and International Affairs Division of the GAO issued an 8 April 1996 report on PERSTEMPO and Military Readiness to the United States Congress,. The report addressed specific concerns of the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, the Honorable Robert K. Dornan. By way of background, the report summarized the current situation as follows:

> The end of the Cold War and the evolution of a new security environment have resulted in new operating realities for the U. S. military. Amid significant reductions in the overall size of U.S. forces, defense budgets, and overseas presence, the U.S. military must continue to deploy its forces for traditional combat training and simultaneously manage increased demands to deploy forces for peace operations and other activities. U.S. military forces have participated in peace operations for many years. However, in recent years, U.S. participation in peace operations has grown.[9]

The report states that their visits to high-deploying units and discussions with officials in major commands revealed pronounced concerns about personnel problems such as divorces, missed family events and holidays, and lowered retention.[10]

The report suggests that a more judicious management of deployments may also require cultural adjustments in the services. The commanders, queried from the unit level through major commands, acknowledged that turning down deployment requests was very difficult because they believed that doing so would reflect negatively on either the unit or them or both.

An Army Special Forces commander in the report acknowledged that the command "never met a deployment opportunity that we didn't like" and challenged the command to curb its traditional appetite for deployments. The report concludes that a number of officials were concerned that commanders in all the services were competing for deployments to underscore the value of their units during the current drawdown.[11]

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Professional Journals and Military-Academic Publications

This section contains reviews of numerous academic works by midgrade officers. These are particularly valuable since they give understanding into the very population this theses seeks to understand. The inclusion of these works is based upon their topical relevance and insights, rather than the attitudes expressed by their authors.

In his thesis "The Evolution of US Army Peace Operations," for the Naval Postgraduate School, December 1995, US Army Captain James J. Wolff asserts that peace operations have had difficulty in being accepted by US Army. He claims peace operations have not been institutionalized and continue to challenge the Army as an institution. Wolff draws this conclusion from the sociological perspective known as social construction, which he used to examine doctrinal development and institutionalization.

Wolff asserts that social constructionism predicts that until a new mission is accepted by the individual and the group, it will continue to cause disequilibrium. He argues that the constant reconceptualization and changing terminology within peace operations reflected the inability of the Army to accept peace operations as a primary mission. Wolff says that the national security strategy of the US is the primary, first step in the social construction of peace operations and that when peace operations were considered to serve national interest, the Army began to develop appropriate doctrine for these missions.

Wolff uses the Army's professional literature to highlight how the Army leadership conceptualized peace operations and the amount of attention that they believed should be dedicated to the mission. Doctrinal development was traced from post-World War II, to demonstrate the inability of the Army to accept peace operations as a primary mission. He argues that until a coherent doctrine for peace operations is developed, these missions will not be accepted and will continue to challenge the Army as an institution. He does conclude that peace

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operations have been accepted as a secondary mission, but have not been institutionalized and continue to challenge the Army.[12]

Wolff asserts the first step in the process of constructing the meaning of peace operations has been met. He reports the political leadership began to stress the importance of peace operations in the latter end of the Reagan administration and reinforced their importance during the Bush administration. Wolff contends the publication of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 by the Clinton administration clearly articulated the requirement for the military to be prepared to execute peace operations. Although PDD 25 states that the military's primary mission is to fight and win, Wolff claims the need to conduct peace operations is clearly linked to the national security interests of the US.

Wolff says the second step in the construction of meaning has begun, but has not yet been met. He believes the initial publications on peace operations represent the beginning of doctrinal development, but a comprehensive doctrine is the next step which must be met. Wolff contends doctrine must address training, force composition, conflict dynamics, mission structures, and the principles and tenets of peace operations. Ultimately, he thinks the Army may need to make the conceptual leap from AirLand Battle and develop a separate doctrine for these operations. [13]

For Wolff, the third step in the construction of meaning has also begun, but has also not been met. He states this is because the Army leadership has accepted the fact that peace operations will be conducted for the foreseeable future, and though they will always be considered a secondary mission, they do not have to be considered of secondary concern. (The reconciliation of this dilemma may very well be the essence of the Army's problems concerning OOTW today.) Wolff thinks many of the frustrations reflected within the military literature are directed at the need for a coherent doctrine. He concludes that until a coherent doctrine is developed, peace operations will not be accepted by the Army as an institution.[14]

In the article "OOTW: A Concept in Flux" published in the September-October 1996 *Military Review*, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John B. Hunt critiques and expounds upon the ideas put forth by Robert J. Bunker in "Rethinking OOTW" in the November-December 1995 issue of *Military Review*. Hunt agrees with Bunker that "OOTW missions--at least some of them--are a form of warfare."[15] Hunt says that Bunker is also right when he says an "AirLand Battle" approach to OOTW will not suffice. However, Hunt believes Bunker gives the US Army more credit for OOTW concepts and doctrine than it deserves. Hunt concludes that, "as yet, the Army has no valid OOTW concept and no satisfactory OOTW doctrine."[16]

Hunt argues that many Army personnel learned during the Vietnam War that conventional wars of attrition and annihilation, eventually known as AirLand Battle, cannot succeed in highly political conflicts. However, still smarting from its defeat in Vietnam, the Army as an institution refuses to recognize any form of warfare not consistent with the Clausewitzian tradition. Hunt further states, the military success of Operation Desert Storm only reinforces this attitude.[17]

Hunt believes the most serious faults are that the LIC imperatives are deleted, including "political dominance," the main imperative from which all others are derived, and that discarding these imperatives and changing the concept name from LIC to OOTW appear to have been whimsical decisions. Hunt contends that no one thought through the implications, and the result is that the Army has continued to try to deal with political conflict in a conventional, warfighting way--a guaranteed formula for failure.[18]

The 1995 monograph "'QUASI WAR' Training Infantry Small Units for Operations Other Than War" by Major Michael F. Beech examines whether infantry small units, trained and equipped solely for war, can successfully conduct OOTW. Beech contends many military professionals argue that units trained for war can readily adapt to OOTW, while other professional

soldiers and military experts believe that OOTW requires unique capabilities which normal war-fighting training alone does not provide training for.

The monograph examines selected small unit actions in four separate operations from 1989 to 1995. The case studies include Operations Just Cause (Panama), Restore Hope and UNOSOM II (Somalia), Able Sentry (Macedonia), and Restore Democracy (Haiti). The monograph concludes that infantry small units require specialized training, beyond traditional combat training, in order to effectively conduct OOTW. The need for restraint in OOTW fundamentally changes the way small units operate and the means they need to accomplish their mission.[19]

In a 1994 monograph "Army Tactical Requirements For Peace Support Operations" Major Maurice L. Todd, argues that contrary to both past and emerging Army doctrine, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are not separate and distinct operations, but are part of a continuum of peace support operations which the Army may be called upon to execute or support in the near future. He asserts that the Army is currently moving in the wrong direction in its approach to peace operations.

In terms of training, Todd contends that the key requirements are to educate soldiers on rules of engagement (ROE) and to shift their mental focus from strictly combat operations to the upcoming peace support operation. He believes that soldiers should also be trained in skills and tasks normally conducted in peace support operations to augment their combat training.

Todd believes, by first focusing on developing new concepts and doctrine for the use of force in the continuum of peace support operations and by following with the relevant changes in organization, materiel, training, and leader development, the US Army will ensure that US forces recognize the complexity and diversity of such operations before the are employed. He argues that this will increase the prospects for success of US forces in future peace support operations

and will set the stage for further development of concepts and doctrine for such operations in other needed areas.[20]

In the 1995 monograph "The Proliferation of Peace Operations and U.S. Army Tactical Proficiency: Will the Army Remain a Combat Ready Force?" Major Robert J. Botters, Jr., examines the scope and complexity of peace operations and the effects that these operations have on Army tactical units. He also analyzes the degree to which tactical unit core competencies are reinforced or degraded by preparation for and execution of peace operations. The monograph defines tactical unit core competencies and examines peace operations conducted by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States.

The conclusions reached in this study suggest that participation in peace operations can adversely affect the war-fighting skills of tactical units. Evidence suggests units trained and organized for combat operations can maintain core competencies in war-fighting skills while participating in peace operations, if provided adequate resources for training perishable collective war-fighting skills.

Major Botters further argues that units organized for operations in other than traditional or primary warfighting roles invite significant degradation of core competencies. Finally, Botters cautions that the US Army should avoid nontraditional organizations for peace operations and remain focused on preparing units for combat operations.[21]

Lieutenant Colonel Jerry D. Hatley's "The Effects Operations Other Than War Has on the Readiness of the United States Army" (April 1996) presents the view that there is some confusion on exactly what role OOTW has in this nation's national strategic policy and addresses the positive and negative viewpoints of the effects OOTW has on the readiness of the US Army.

Hatley warns, although there are many positive effects OOTW has on the readiness of the US Army and while some units benefit more than others, the prolonged effect could be disastrous

to the Army as a whole. Combat units and some combat support units lose the opportunity to train on their war-fighting skills while they are involved in peacekeeping missions and all units lose the art of training as a combined arms force in preparing for a defensive or offensive operation. He contends the retraining time after an OOTW mission requires the Army to perform dedicated training for at least four-to-six months to return to a high state of combat readiness.[22]

Hatley asserts, the longer the Army spends on conducting peacekeeping, the more justification the senior leaders have in making the Army a peacekeeper of domestic issues. He argues that the Army's doctrinal writers are now focusing more on peacekeeping roles than ever before and that the Army is becoming slowly immersed in peacekeeping and at the same time focusing less on its primary mission of fighting wars. Hatley concludes that the present national strategic policy on OOTW commits the US Army to a permanent peacekeeping force.[23]

The purpose of the article "Military Service and the Life-Course Perspective: A Turning Point for Military Personnel Research" by Paul A. Gade of the US Army's Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences is to establish the need for a new perspective for military personnel research and to suggest the adoption of the life-course paradigm to fulfill that need.[24]

Gade asserts that contemporary research models in military manpower and personnel research have been inadequate for the task of addressing the long-term costs and benefits of military service. He states that recent military personnel research consists of ad hoc, empirically based, theoretical attempts to address current high-priority problems and that these studies have been concerned primarily with predicting events rather than explaining them.[25]

Gade explains that the leading paradigm in military accessioning research, the marketing research model, is not useful because it is based largely on a theory of consumer behavior and falls short of accounting for behaviors in long-term commitments, such as enlistment decision

making, and seems to be particularly ill-suited for assessing the long-term effects of such decisions.

Gade believes the dominant approach to retention and reenlistment research, the job turnover model (Mobley, Hand, Baker, and Meglino, 1979), has proven similarly inadequate. This model, based on expectancy theory, fails to consider the continuing effects of an individual's previous military and nonmilitary life experiences on retention behavior. Additionally, the model does not consider the timing of military service in relation to significant socioeconomic events, such as marriage and education. Furthermore, this approach, like the marketing model, is silent on the long-term consequences of the retention decision itself.[26]

Gade contends the life-course paradigm provides the conceptual model and theoretical orientation needed to address effectively the long-term costs and benefits of military service.[27] He argues that the life-course theory compels the focus be on variables and relationships that differ from those studied in the more traditional approaches to explaining enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment behaviors.[28]

Life-course theory also suggests new methods for data collection and analysis. An example would be collecting longitudinal data that incorporate the social and historical context of the events surrounding the activation of forces for the Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations and analyzing those data according to age cohort. Gade states without this context, it may be difficult to explain short-term as well as long-term shifts in behavior within or between cohorts.[29]

The life-course paradigm also suggests a whole new line of research questions and issues surrounding the intergenerational effects of military service experiences. For example, it is a widely held belief that children who grew up in military families were different as a result, such as having a greater propensity for military service themselves.[30] Regrettably, because of available time, this research cannot exploit all of the techniques Gade suggests.

Relevant Research Studies

The report, *The Stress of Transitions: Illness Reports and the Health of the United States Battalion During the Initial Sinai MFO Deployment*, conducted by the US Army Medical Research Unit, is an overview of the health of the airborne infantry battalion deployed to the Multinational Force Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai in 1982. The longitudinal data, from several measures derived from records of the health care system, clearly reveal the effects of the stress of transition on health and health-related behavior.[31]

The report indicates the health of the soldiers in the Sinai was worse than that of soldiers in the same battalion eighteen months previously in the US. There were many injuries and related musculoskeletal problems which are commonly found among combat soldiers. There was a high rate of gastrointestinal problems in the initial time period. The report concludes, the health of this population of soldiers was influenced by their mission. There was a general increase in the use of the medical resources during transition periods as well as an increase in environmentally influenced problems.[32]

The 1984 study "Observations from the Sinai: Boredom--A Peacekeeping Irritant" by Jesse J. Harris and David R. Segal, performed for the US Army Medical Research Unit (a subunit of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research), finds one of the problems with OOTW, in general, and the MFO in the Sinai, in particular, is boredom. This finding surfaced roughly midway through the deployment. The four types of boredom mentioned by the troops in order of the frequency with which they were mentioned are: (1) underutilization, (2) cultural deprivation, (3) lack of privacy, and (4) isolation. They point out that mere attempts to fill the troop's time obviously did not address this range of feelings of boredom.[33]

With regard to the Sinai mission in particular, they found that commanders who believed that boredom is the result of inactivity characteristically respond by trying to assure that their

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soldiers had a full schedule of activities. However, the troops in the Sinai who complained of boredom were dealing with a complex set of experiences and emotions relating to perceived deprivations and loss of control.[34] The authors contend that leaders who require activities solely to keep men busy may fail to meet the emotional needs of their troops, and are likely to continue to hear very busy soldiers complaining of boredom.[35]

They assert the boredom problem can possibly be reduced by training that, rather than being "more realistic than the mission," prepares the soldier for the mission. This includes a greater understanding of the nature of peacekeeping operations: political as well as military.

The 1987 study "Deterrence, Peacekeeping, and Combat Orientation in the U.S. Army" by David R. Segal, Jesse J. Harris, Joseph M. Rothberg, and David H. Marlowe expands on the above study. They contend an indicator of the potential effect of low-intensity operations on the combat orientation of soldiers is their evaluation of those operations. The authors assert, "The literature on peacekeeping operations almost universally suggests that a major problem with such missions is boredom."[36]

The post-return study of the paratroopers serving in the Sinai MFO showed over 30 percent of them reporting it to be boring and over 40 percent suggesting that it was not an appropriate mission for their unit. That study reports the deployed troops boredom contributed to "Creeping Bedouin Syndrome:" an adaptation to the desert environment involving temporal disorientation and decreased energy and attention levels.[37] The authors contend these symptoms clearly may contribute to decreased combat effectiveness. Segal in a previous study hypothesized that the low activity level of peacekeeping operations may have contributed to security lapses at the Marine headquarters that was bombed in Beirut in October 1983.[38]

This study finds that when combat soldiers return from peacekeeping duty, and are returned to a regimen of realistic combat training that this return to preparation for the deterrence

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as opposed to a constabulary function helps the combat soldiers quickly overcome whatever residual lethargy remains from constabulary missions.[39]

Questions about the excitement and appropriateness of the Sinai peacekeeping operation were asked of the first (A) and the third (B) units to serve there (after their return). In addition, parallel questions were asked of unit B about Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury). The table below (Table 1) presents the attitudes regarding the level of excitement and appropriateness of the Sinai mission--as well as responses regarding Grenada expressed by soldiers from the latter unit.

Table 1. Evaluation of Sinai (MFO) and Grenada Missions

Mission Rated	Unit A	Unit B	Unit B
	Sinai Mission	Sinai Mission	Grenada Mission
Exciting	15.7 %	9.1 %	61.4 %
Interesting	43.1 %	73.9 %	38.6 %
Boring	31.4 %	12.5 %	0.0 %
Appropriate	54.9 %	48.3 %	98.9 %
Not Appropriate	43.1 %	51.7 %	1.1 %

The most impressive differences in the table are between the evaluations of the Sinai and Grenada missions by the troops who had been in both places. None of the soldiers found Grenada boring, and over 60 percent found it exciting, compared with fewer than 10 percent who found the Sinai mission exciting. Almost all of the soldiers said that the Grenada operation was appropriate for their unit. The authors argue these data demonstrate a preference for higher intensity operations among soldiers who have participated in low-intensity operations.[40]

They conclude that perhaps most important is that soldiers who had served both in the Sinai and in Grenada--two low-intensity missions which nonetheless differed markedly in

their level of intensity--showed a marked preference for the latter mission and a feeling that the higher-intensity mission (Grenada) was the more appropriate for their unit.[41]

Drs. Mark Paris and Joseph Rothberg of the Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, conducted a study titled "A Factor-analytic Study of Deployment Attitudes of the Sinai Peacekeeping Force." The authors took a 1984 study by Segal, Harris, Rothberg, and Marlowe of an airborne infantry unit deployed to the MFO and performed a correlation matrix of the attitudinal data.

The findings suggest that race appears to be an important determinant of attitude towards specific types of deployment. The results suggested that motivation and morale depend, to some degree, on the extent to which a soldier can identify with or attach personal meaning to the mission at hand.[42] Over 40 percent of the comparisons of black versus white troop attitudes were found to differ from each other to a statistically significant degree.[43]

It was revealed that white troops felt significantly more positive towards deployment for the purposes of invasion of the US by a foreign enemy, invasion of a Western European ally, rescuing American civilians in danger overseas, involvement in a war that is popular at home, restoring law and order during a disaster, stopping the violence of blacks threatening private property, and attacking a band of revolutionaries.[44]

In a 1996 study "The Family Factor and Retention Among Married Soldiers Deployed in Operation Desert Storm," Leora N. Rosen and Doris Briley Durand examined the issue of organizational and marital factors that contribute to the retention and reenlistment plans of married junior enlisted and mid-level noncommissioned officer (NCO) families in the US Army. The study is based on questionnaire data provided by Army spouses who participated in the Operation Desert Storm Family Well-Being Survey. They obtained background information on soldier and

family issues through mailed questionnaires that were self-administered during Operation Desert Storm (1991) and using a follow-up survey conducted one year after Desert Storm (1992).

The information was used to compare couples who left the Army with those who remained on active duty. They found the main predictor of retention for junior enlisted families was the spouse's unrealistic expectations of what the Army could provide as resources for families of deployed soldiers. The main predictor of retention for NCO couples was the spouse's wish that the soldier either stay in or get out of the Army. Soldier's rank was the main predictor of reenlistment intentions among NCO families, with higher-ranking soldiers more likely to plan on staying in the Army. Marital problems also emerged as one of the significant predictors of retention for both junior enlisted and NCO couples, indicating that although this issue is relevant to retention, its impact is not limited to younger families.[45]

Mark A Vaitkus and Paul T. Bartone of the US Army Medical Research Unit-Europe presented a report entitled "Attitudes Toward Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Among US Infantry Soldiers Deployed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" to the XIII World Congress of the International Sociological Association in Bielefeld, Germany, 18-23 July 1994.

This study incorporated the results of two previous studies. The first study is on airborne infantry soldiers deployed to the MFO in 1984 (Segal, Harris, Rothberg, and Marlowe, 1984). The second study examines a light infantry unit deployed to the MFO in 1990 (Segal, Furakawa, and Lindh, 1990). Since this study adequately incorporates the data of the two aforementioned studies they will not be reviewed in this paper. (Selected specific data from these three studies is presented alongside data from this research in chapter four of this paper.)

This study reported survey findings from 171 members of the 6-502d Infantry who had just returned to Berlin from their deployment to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in

support of Operation Able Sentry (July 1993-January 1994). The focus was on those items related to attitudes about peacekeeping and serving with the UN as part of a multinational force. Like the units in the previous studies, about half of the 6-502d soldiers questioned the appropriateness of the mission for their unit. More than two-thirds recognized the importance of specialized peacekeeping training prior to taking up their border positions. Furthermore, the vast majority felt the battalion was well trained for the mission, completed the mission successfully, and had no difficulties serving under a UN commander.[46]

The 1994 report "Peacekeeping in Somalia" describes findings from questionnaires and interviews involving 518 Somalia veterans at Fort Drum, New York. The Somalia peacekeeping mission is unique because it started as a humanitarian mission and evolved into combat.[47] The subjects were 487 Somalia veterans who were queried using questionnaires. Their ranks were: 20 percent private to private first class, 55 percent corporal, 19 percent sergeant and staff sergeant, 4 percent sergeant first class to sergeant major, and six percent second lieutenant to major.[48]

The soldiers were asked if they would support OOTW, the responses are depicted in table 2 below.[49] The Somalia veterans were asked for their opinions concerning how confident they were about soldiers' willingness to stay in the shrinking Army. Responding to the question about whether the best officers will stay, 6 percent were extremely confident, 15 percent were very confident, 35 percent were moderately confident, 30 percent were somewhat unsure, and 14 percent were very unsure.[50] (When asked about noncommissioned officers the responses were similar.)

Table 2. Somalia Veterans Support for Various Operations Other Than War

Mission	Definitely Would	Probably Would	Probably Not	Definitely Not
Combat Flow of Illegal Drugs in US	65 %	21 %	6 %	9 %
Disaster Relief in the US	67 %	25 %	5 %	3 %
Humanitarian Relief in the US	15 %	29 %	32 %	24 %
Part of UN Peacekeeping	16 %	25 %	29 %	30 %
Counter-Terrorism in the US	76 %	18 %	3 %	3 %
Maintain Military Presence Overseas	47 %	39 %	8 %	6 %
Training Federal, State, and Municipal Employees	44 %	38 %	11%	7 %

The soldiers were asked about their level of satisfaction with a variety of occurrences during Operation Restore/Continue Hope. The category "very dissatisfied" was combined with "dissatisfied," and the category "very satisfied" was combined with "satisfied." The results are shown in table 3:

Table 3. Soldiers' Satisfaction With Events That Occurred During the Somalia Deployment

	Dissatisfied	Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied	Satisfied
Support from the American people	12 %	29 %	68 %
Performance of US soldiers	4 %	8 %	88 %
Decisions made by top US military	57 %	26 %	18 %
Decisions made by top UN military	66 %	27 %	7 %
Recognition for soldiers' performance	49 %	20 %	30 %

Of the 487 respondents to the questionnaire, 106 offered written comments.[51] The comment made most frequently concerned soldiers' perceptions that they had lacked a clearly defined mission. They made statements such as "we needed a clear, concise mission," it was a "shooting-humanitarian mission," and "We should have known what we were getting into." The next most frequent comments had to do with the nature of the mission. Some of the comments were: "all Somalia was politics," "there was no reason for 18 dead Americans," "it was a lost cause," "Somalia wasted time, money and lives," "we fought for nothing," "there was a needless loss of lives," "we should have stopped at Restore Hope: Continue Hope shouldn't have happened," and "Somalia was a mistake."

The next most frequent comment concerned rules of engagement. Soldiers said that the "inability to return fire was upsetting," that the rules were "too strict." A number of soldiers expressed strong feelings about awarding the Combat Infantryman's Badge. Their comments included "the combat patch is bull without the CIB," "the CIB was withheld because of the date of redeployment," the CIB should be awarded because there was "more pressure to do the job without force."[52] Most of the responses to the survey about the appropriateness of the Army's participating in alternative missions were positive with the single exception of peacekeeping missions.[53]

Psychological Issues in Peacekeeping Contingency Operations

Paul T. Bartone, Mark A. Vaistus, and Amy B. Adler of the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe in 1994 published a study of soldiers deployed as part of Operation Provide Promise. These soldiers from the US Army in Europe provided medical care for the 25,000 United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) soldiers located in the former Yugoslavia. Using a longitudinal approach and multiple methods, the research identified the key sources of stress before, during,

and after the six-month deployment and assessed the impact of these stressors on soldiers' health and morale.[54]

In March of 1993, a specially configured US Army task force of about 300 soldiers in Germany was identified as the next unit to provide medical support for 25,000 UN peacekeeping forces operating in the former Yugoslavia.[55] The study reports that for many of the married soldiers, despite fairly good mail and telephone service, concern for families back home was a major issue. This concern was often linked to the poor attempts of some rear detachment elements to keep in touch with family members. Finally, many perceived an unfair distribution of rewards and resources, such as special UN pay, awards, supplies, and access to vehicles, leading to a sense of deprivation relative to soldiers from other nations, and, occasionally, to other American troops not assigned to the hospital.[56]

The authors determined there was a continued sense of relative deprivation and ambiguity about the mission itself and its value. While the opportunity to treat a small number of civilian "humanitarian" patients at the hospital was welcomed by the staff, it also led to increased questions about why more humanitarian medical care was not permitted.[57]

Throughout the deployment, soldiers reported high levels of concern about the drawdown and its associated uncertainty for their units and families. Soldiers also reported high levels of stress associated with missing their spouses, boredom, and restlessness. Despite specific concerns relative to the deployment, larger drawdown issues were a persistent stressful theme.[58]

The interview data revealed that initial levels of morale and cohesion were influenced in part by an excitement and enthusiasm for the special medical peacekeeping mission, the chance to make a difference, and the chance to implement training. The authors speculate that as the deployment progressed, the decline in morale and cohesion may have been influenced by the relative lack of meaningful work activity.[59]

Peacekeeping and UN Operational Control: A Study of Their Effect on Unit Cohesion

In a study that attracted national media attention, Lieutenant Commander Ernest G. Cunningham, (USN) noted that several factors can degrade unit cohesion and subsequently combat effectiveness. The study concentrates on two such factors. The US and UN operational control and OOTW. Cunningham surveyed three-hundred U.S. Marine Corps soldiers. The soldiers ranged in pay grades E-1 through E-7 for the enlisted and O-1 through O-3 for the officers; 293 were enlisted and 7 were officers.[60]

The results revealed that nontraditional missions were acceptable to a majority of the soldiers if these missions were conducted in the US and under US operational control. When the question shifted to missions conducted outside the U.S., however, a notable shift towards negative responses occurred. The most significant responses were to missions conducted under UN operational control. Fully 64 percent of the soldiers disagreed with participation in any of the missions listed when under UN operational control.[61]

The US soldiers consider UN company and battalion officer operational control as unacceptable. The responses for UN operational control ranged from 69.3 percent to 76.7 percent against.[62] A total of 73.5 percent desired not to serve with UN soldiers under UN operational control.[63]

Regarding loyalties, Cunningham reminds that for thousands of years military organizations have required their soldiers to swear to some form of code or allegiance. He contends a code provides a standard for the soldier to live up to and in many cases die for. A code can be a powerful tool for establishing and sustaining unit cohesion. (The Ranger Creed is certainly one such example.) When asked if the soldiers would swear to a UN code similar to their own, 69.33 percent refused to swear to such a code.[64]

The question of the survey caused national consternation when an unauthorized copy was released by one of the survey participants to his elected representative and a news media organization. It became a subject of discussion on three syndicated radio talk shows, the internet and articles published in syndicated newspapers. The question asks the participants about their willingness to fire on U.S. citizens. The results, with 88 percent responding, revealed that 61.7 percent said they would refuse to fire on US citizens, whereas 26.3 percent indicated they would fire.[65]

Cunningham asserts that unit cohesion cannot be achieved if the soldiers do not have faith in their leadership, mission, or purpose. He believes the execution of missions that lack national support will erode cohesion of fighting units, and that these operations have made a tremendous impact on operational tempo, resources, and funding for training. He argues that a possible long-term effect of peacekeeping missions, if they do not have the support of the nation, could well be a negative impact on retention and recruiting.[66]

Realizing the conflict and incongruity peacekeeping represents in a combat organizational model, Cunningham suggests another possibility may be more realistic. He believes it may be necessary to bifurcate the military, concluding that such a change could promote specialization and provide an opportunity to those who desire peacekeeping duty. He suggests that perhaps it is time to designate separate fighting forces and peacekeeping forces. Somewhat ominously Cunningham concludes, "What seems more and more certain as time goes on is that the US is realizing the tremendous drain of OOTW on the fighting forces. Business cannot proceed as usual."[67]

The very thorough study "Psychological Well-Being and Physical Health Symptoms of Soldiers Deployed for Operation Uphold Democracy: A Summary of Human Dimensions Research in Haiti" analyzed questionnaires completed by 3,205 soldiers deployed for Operation

Uphold Democracy. The executive summary of the survey indicates that four general factors were influencing the well-being of soldiers in Haiti. They are the: (1) opeartional environment; (2) family separation; (3) unit and work issues, and; (4) policy issues.

The stress associated with the operational environment indicated that the living conditions were stressful on the soldiers. The poor level of sanitation in Haiti was stressful for eighty-four percent of the soldiers (forty-two percent reported extreme stress). Although soldiers generally reported that they worried little about being wounded, killed, or attacked by Haitians, over seventy-five percent of the soldiers reported that they were worried to some extent about getting a disease.[68]

The second factor was stress due to family separation. This stress was heightened for soldiers who missed the birth of a child, had been deployed multiple times, or were not given enough time to make a transition into a new unit. The study found phone and mail communication between soldiers and their families helped a majority of the soldiers deal more effectively with family separation stress.[69]

The third set of factors. unit and work issues indicated that the soldiers' assessments of their leaders were among the strongest predictors of their well-being. In the units that soldiers perceived their leaders to be caring and competent soldiers reported significantly higher psychological well-being and significantly fewer physical health symptoms. When the soldiers were performing jobs they were trained for they reported less psychological and physical distress.[70]

The fourth set of factors related to the well-being of soldiers in Haiti were broader policy issues. The ambiguity and repeated changes in return date information was the most frequent stressor. Soldiers that were told to expect a six month tour appeared to cope best. The value the soldiers saw in the overall operation was related to their psychological and physical well-being.

Soldiers who were briefed regularly concerning the mission and the accomplishments of the mission reported higher belief in the overall operation.[71] When the soldiers believed that the people of the US did not appreciate what they were doing in Haiti (fifty percent) they reported less belief in the operation.[72]

General Observations of the Literature

In this chapter studies analyzing the effects of OOTW operations in Somalia and Haiti are presented, as well as numerous studies concerning the MFO and the former Yugoslavian Republic. Noticeably absent are any studies on the ongoing operation in Bosnia, Joint Endeavor. Although the subjects of these studies were not specifically midgrade officers, although they are incorporated into the populations in some cases.

The doctrinal publications examined all recognized that OOTW operations effect the mind-set of the "combat-warrior" and that specific retraining or reorientation time is required for a unit to be fully ready to perform its wartime mission. The doctrinal publications did recognize the role leaders have in reorienting the unit, but did not otherwise address specific implications or effects upon the midgrade officer.

[1]John B. Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," *Military Review*, LXXVI (5), (September-October 1996): 5.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 16 June 1995): 18.

[4]Ibid., 22.

[5]Joint Publication 3-07.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 29 April 1994): VI-1.

[6]Ibid., VI-7.

[7]US Army FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC; US Government Printing Office, December 1994): 37.

[8]FM 100-23, 88-89.

[9]Government Accounting Office, "National Security and International Affairs Division Report to The Subcommittee on Military Readiness," (Washington, DC. Government Printing Office, 8 April 1996): 1.

[10]Ibid., 3.

[11]Ibid., 11.

[12]James J. Wolff, "The Evolution of US Army Peace Operations," Naval Postgraduate School. (Monterey, CA., December 1995): 91.

[13]Ibid., 93.

[14]James J. Wolff, "The Evolution of US Army Peace Operations," (MA in National Security Affairs Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1995), 93-94.

[15]Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," 3.

[16]Ibid., 4.

[17]Ibid., 6.

[18]Ibid..

[19]Michael F. Beech, Major, "Quasi-War: Training Infantry Small Units for Operations Other Than War." (School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, December 1995), 45.

[20]Maurice L. Todd. Major. "Army Tactical Requirements For Peace Support Operations" (School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), 40.

[21]Robert J. Botters, Jr., Major, "The Proliferation of Peace Operations and U.S. Army Tactical Proficiency: Will the Army Remain a Combat Ready Force?" (School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 43.

[22]Jerry D. Hatley (LTC), USA. "The Effects Operations Other Than War Has on the Readiness of the United States Army," (Army War College, April 1996): 18.

[23]Ibid., 19.

[24]Paul A. Gade, "Military Service and the Life-Course Perspective: A Turning Point for Military Personnel Research." *Military Psychology*, 3 (4) (1991): 187.

[25]Ibid., 189.

[26]Ibid., 190.

[27]Ibid., 191.

[28]Ibid., 193.

[29]Ibid., 195.

[30]Ibid., 196.

[31]United States Army Medical Research Unit, "The Stress of Transitions: Illness Reports and the Health of the United States Battalion During the Initial Sinai MFO Deployment," US Army Medical Research Unit, Fort Bragg, NC (1984): 67.

[32]Ibid., 82.

[33]Jesse J. Harris and David R. Segal, "Observations From the Sinai: Boredom—A Peacekeeping Irritant," United States Army Medical Research Unit. (1984): 48.

[34]Ibid., 56.

[35]Ibid., 57.

[36]David R. Segal, Jesse J. Harris, Joseph M. Rothberg, and David H. Marlowe, "Deterrence, Peacekeeping and Combat Orientation in the U.S. Army," Department of Military Psychiatry. Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, (1987): 49.

[37]Jesse J. Harris and David R. Segal. "Observations From the Sinai: The Boredom Factor" *Armed Forces and Society* (Winter 1985): 235.

[38]David R. Segal and Katharine Swift Gravino, "Peacekeeping as a Military Mission," in *The Hundred Percent Challenge*, ed. Charles D. Smith (Cabin John: Seven Locks Press, 1985): 34.

[39]Segal, Harris, Rothberg, and Marlowe. "Deterrence, Peacekeeping and Combat Orientation in the U.S. Army," 41.

[40]Ibid., 50-51.

[41]Ibid., 52.

[42]Mark Paris and Joseph Rothberg, "A Factor-analytic Study of Deployment Attitudes of the Sinai Peacekeeping Force." Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, (1984): 175.

[43]Ibid., 179.

[44]Ibid., 181.

[45]Leora N. Rosen and Doris Briley Durand, "The Family Factor and Retention Among Married Soldiers Deployed in Operation Desert Storm," *Military Psychology* 7 (4), (1996): 221.

[46]Mark A Vaitkus and Paul T. Bartone, "Attitudes Toward Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Among US Infantry Soldiers Deployed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," US Army Medical Research Unit-Europe, (1994): 5.

[47]Joan Harman. "Peacekeeping in Somalia," U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, (July 1994): 2.

[48]Ibid., 8.

[49]Ibid., 9.

[50]Ibid., 10.

[51]Ibid., 19.

[52]Ibid., 20.

[53]Ibid., 23.

[54]Paul T. Bartone, Mark A. Vaistus and Amy B. Adler. "Psychological Issues in Peacekeeping Contingency Operations," US Army Medical Research Unit-Europe. (August 1994): 2..

[55]Ibid., 4.

[56]Ibid., 8.

[57]Ibid., 9.

[58]Ibid., 9-10.

[59]Ibid., 11.

[60]Ernest G. Cunningham, "Peacekeeping and U.N. Operational Control: A Study of Their Effect on Unit Cohesion," (MA in National Security Affairs Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 1995), 24.

[61]Ibid., iv.

[62]Ibid., 47.

[63]Ibid., 57.

[64]Ibid., 76.

[65]Ibid., 79.

[66]Ibid., 83.

[67]Ibid., 84.

[68]Ronald R. Halverson, Ph.D., CPT Paul D. Bliese, Ph.D., SGT Robert E. Moore, and CPT Carl A. Castro, Ph.D., "Psychological Well-Being and Physical Health Symptoms of Soldiers Deployed for Operation Uphold Democracy: A Summary of Human Dimensions Research in Haiti," (Walter Reed Army Institute Army of Research, Washington, DC. 17 May 1995), 1.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Ibid., 2.

[71]Ibid..

[72]Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS

Selecting the Method of Data Collection

To determine the attitudes of midgrade officers there were three potential sources

considered for this data: empirical data, personal interviews, and a questionnaire.

Methods Evaluated

The first method considered was the use of existing empirical data. The most significant

source for empirical data is the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

(ARI). The two major surveys they have conducted that have relevance are the "Attitudes and

Perceptions of Junior Army Officers" and the "Army Sample Survey of Military Personnel

(SSMP)." The former was discounted because it was conducted in 1988, 1989, 1990, and most

recently in 1992, prior to Operations Restore Hope, Uphold Democracy, or Joint Endeavor. The

SSMP was not used because it did not have the sufficient detail desired regarding OOTW. The

potential for bias may also have been greater with ARI products since their surveys are

underwritten and directed by the Army itself.

The second means of data collection considered was to conduct personal interviews. This

technique was discounted for three main reasons: (1) the lack of anonymity and the potential for

bias in the interview process, (2) the time expenditure required, and (3) the difficulty in

categorizing and quantifying the responses.

Ultimately, a questionnaire was determined to be the preferred method. This allowed for

the inclusion of questions asked in three previous studies of peacekeeping operations. The questionnaire also provided for anonymity of respondents, provided the most contemporary data available, and allowed for the selection of a specific target population.

Development of the Questionnaire

The first questionnaire designed had thirty-two questions. On 5 November 1996, twenty surveys were distributed to sixteen, randomly selected, active component US Army officers and the four Reserve component officers of division B, section 7 of the academic year 1996-1997 (AY 97) Command and General Staff Officers College class. By 7 November 1996, ten surveys had been returned (50 fifty percent response rate). Two of those ten respondents had reported OOTW experiences. One officer had participated in three operations (Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia), the other officer two operations (the LA Riots and a rotation with the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) mission).

This survey explicitly asked for any suggestions or comments that could improve the survey. No suggestions were made by any of the respondents. Based on a review of this instrument by Dr. V. Scherberger, Chief of the Development Assessment Division of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) three demographic questions were deleted. These questions asked the respondents about their marital status, religious preference, and political affiliation.

The relevance of these variables (and their use as controlling variables) in understanding the officers' attitudes are emphasized by Samuel P. Huntington in his book *The Soldier and the State*. In it, Huntington suggests that the a priori assumption that certain values are military, and thus are held by military men may or may not be true. Huntington submits that an alternative approach is to define military values by source and that not all military attitudes are from a military source. He forthrightly notes that:

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Military men are also Frenchmen and Americans, Methodists and Catholics, liberals and reactionaries, Jews and anti-semites. Any given statement by a military man may not reflect his attitudes *qua* military man but may instead stem from social, economic, political, or religious affiliations irrelevant to his military role.[1]

A question to determine the race of the respondent was considered for inclusion; however, a deliberate decision was made not to include it in the initial survey. It may not have been allowed to remain in the final questionnaire, even if it had been included in the initial survey. It should be noted that the deliberate omission of race as a variable is not without consequence. Dr. Mark L. Paris and Dr. Joseph M. Rothberg of the Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, in "A Factor-analytic Study of Deployment Attitudes of the Sinai Peacekeeping Force" concluded "Findings suggest that race appears to be an important determinant of attitude towards specific types of deployment; overall results suggested that motivation and morale depend, to some degree, on the extent to which a soldier can identify with or attach personal meaning to the mission at hand."[2]

To keep the questionnaire as brief as possible, and to ease the data evaluation process, six questions were removed from the initial survey. The question regarding component (Active, Reserve, or National Guard) was deleted since all of the Reserve and Guard officers had departed by 16 December 1996. One question regarding combat experience was added to the questionnaire, for a total of twenty-four questions in the final questionnaire.

The Final Questionnaire

The final survey consists of twenty-four questions that can be divided into six sections: (1) basic demographic data of all respondents, (2) attitudes towards OOTW, (3) usefulness and consequences of OOTW deployments, (4) propensity for service until retirement, (5) previous combat participation, and (6) actual OOTW participant portion. (If the respondent had not deployed for an OOTW, he only completed sections one to five.) Section six establishes the role

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and mission of the OOTW participant's deployments. A complete copy of the final questionnaire is at appendix A.

Section One

The first six questions are demographic data. This data is necessary to understand the source of commission, rank, branch and functional area, sex, and if Ranger qualified. Question three determines the branch category, i.e., combat arms, combat support, or combat service support. Question four has the respondent provide his actual branch and functional area (FA), question five gender, and six--ranger qualification.

Section Two

Questions seven through ten use the Likert scale to determine the soldier's attitude towards OOTW. These same questions have been asked in three previous studies. The first study using these questions was in 1984 when an airborne infantry battalion completed the questions after returning from a six-month deployment to the Sinai as part of the multinational force observers (MFO). The second was the MFO post-deployment interview of a light infantry battalion in 1990. The third use of these questions was in 1994 when the Berlin Brigade's 6-502d Infantry Battalion had returned to Berlin from six months of border patrol duty under a Danish commander in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM). The peacekeeping mission was named Operation Able Sentry.

Section Three

Questions eleven and twelve are close-ended questions that ask the respondents their attitudes towards the future frequency of OOTW and the utility of the skills learned in performing the OOTW mission.

Section Four

Questions thirteen and fourteen use the Likert scale to determine attitudes on the tempo of OOTW missions and the effects of eroding benefits on propensity towards separating from the service prior to retirement. The erosion of fringe benefits and its negative effect on attitudes and career intentions was the subject of studies conducted by previous CGSOC students in 1969, 1971, and 1976.

Section Five

Question fifteen is a close-ended question and determines participation in the four most recent "combat" operations (Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and Desert Storm). It should be noted that some research has treated Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) and Operation Just Cause (Panama) as OOTW. It is acknowledged that combat is not excluded from certain OOTW operations.

Section Six

Questions sixteen through twenty-four pertain to OOTW participation. Question sixteen determines which OOTW that respondent has participated in. A blank space allows for listing of less prominent operations. e.g., the Los Angeles riots. This is the last question for those respondents that have not participated in OOTW. Questions seventeen through twenty-four allow for the respondent to provide responses for three separate operations for each question. These questions provide the basic data pertaining to OOTW deployments, such as the type of unit the respondent deployed with. Question eighteen allows the respondent to categorize the principal role or mission of his unit.

Questions nineteen through twenty-one ask the respondent to self-determine the degree of mission accomplishment and appropriateness of the deployment(s) for both his unit and the

Army. Questions twenty-two and twenty-three ask for the length of the deployment(s) and the impact of the deployment(s) on unit combat readiness. Question twenty-four asks the respondent to determine if his OOTW participation has affected the likelihood of employing lethal force in future combat operations.

The life-course model is depicted in figure 2. How the specific survey questions and the modified life-course trajectory model are correlated is depicted by indicating the relevant survey question's number at the bottom of one of the four boxes.

| **Historic and Military-political** | **Military Doctrine and Policies** | **Social and Cultural** |

ENVIRONMENT

| INDIVIDUAL BELIEFS & ATTITUDES | PERSONAL MILITARY EXPERIENCES | EXPERIENCES (COLLECTIVE) MILITARY | ATTITUDES ON OOTW |

| * POLITICAL
* RELIGION
* MARITAL
GENDER
CURRENT RANK

QUES # 2, 5, * | BRANCH TNG
RANGER TNG
DUTY ASSIGNMNT
SOURCE OF COMM
LNGTH DEPLOYD

1, 3, 4, 6. 22 | COMBAT EXPERIECE
OOTW PARTICIPANT
TYPE OF UNIT
UNIT MISSION
UNIT SUCCESS

15, 16, 17, 18, 19 | APPROPRIATENESS
ADDITIONAL SKILLS
USE OF FORCE
COMBAT READINESS
USEFULNESS

7- 12, 20, 21, 23 |

CORRESPONDING QUESTION NUMBERS DEPICTED BELOW EACH LIFE-COURSE AREA

* Development Assessment Division did not permit these questions to be asked

Figure 2. Life-Course Theory Question Correlation Model

Procedures

Distribution of the surveys was made through the student distribution boxes located in each section's classroom. The respondent had the option of returning the survey directly to the designated student mail box or placing it in the distribution pickup boxes located throughout the college. The questionnaire was designed so that after completion the respondent merely folded it in half to reveal a preprinted address. The section survey control officers and distribution clerks were advised of the survey in the event that any surveys were inadvertently turned into them.

On 24 January 1997, a total of 197 surveys were distributed. By 5 February 1997, 114 of the surveys had been returned. This equates to a 58 percent response rate.

Respondents

The total number of active-duty US Army officers currently enrolled in division B of the CGSOC AY 97 is 197 students. Based on this population size, a sample size of 132 is required to have a 95 percent level of confidence. A return of 113 surveys would give a 90 percent confidence level these results accurately reflect division B.

To obtain a representative sample of the entire CGSOC population, a stratified sample was obtained by selecting one of the CGSOC's four divisions. Division B was designated as the sample population. Since the school representatively divides the students among the staff groups and sections by branch and gender, by selecting an entire division, it ensured the sample was internally reliable (see Table 4).

The reliability of the sample population to the Division B population is depicted in Table 5 of this chapter. There is no way to determine how representative Division B is of the entire class concerning political affiliation, religion, or marital status. It is expected however that these variables are randomly distributed throughout all divisions.

Table 4. Comparison of Division B Population to AY 97 CGSOC Population (Army)

Variable	Actual Division B Population (N=197)	Actual CGSOC Population (N=777)	Chi Square
Combat Arms	91/46 %	364/47 %	0.014
Combat Support	52/26 %	206/26 %	0.000
Combat Service Support	54/27 %	207/27 %	0.034
Gender (Male)	178/90 %	695/89 %	0.014
Gender (Female)	19/10 %	82/11 %	0.125

Outcomes of Research Design Implemented

Demographical Data

On 28 January 1997, 197 questionnaires were distributed to the active duty US Army officers in Division B of the Command and General Staff College's CGSOC class AY-97. By 5 February 1996, there had been 114 questionnaires returned. (Three surveys were received after the suspense date and are not included in the results.) This is a response rate of 58 percent. One of the surveys is not included in the results because it was filled out with erroneous data. The 113 responses make the survey reliable to the 90 percent confidence level.

Source of Commission and Gender

Question one of the survey asked for the source of commission. Question five asked for the respondents gender. A total of 105 (93 percent) of the respondents are male, eight (7 percent) are female. The largest source of commissioning for both of the sexes is the Reserve Officers Training Corps with seventy-nine officers (70 percent), the second largest is West Point with 16 officers (14 percent), and the last is, Officer Candidate School with 14 officers (12 percent). The

'other' source for commissioning officers is four (3.5 percent); they are comprised mainly of medical and chaplain corps officers. Figure 3 depicts the source of commission by gender.


Figure 3. Source of Commission by Gender

Branch Categories

Question three asked the officers their branch category, i.e., combat arms, combat support, or combat service support. The largest branch category is the combat arms (CA) with 49 officers (43 percent), the second largest is combat service support (CSS) with 33 officers (29 percent), and the smallest branch category is combat support (CS) with 31 officers (27 percent).

It should be noted that this breakdown of branch category is based on the respondents characterization of their branch category. The engineers in this survey differed in their responses to branch category. Five of the engineers reported combat arms and five reported combat support. One engineer respondent wrote in the comment, "officially combat arms, commonly considered combat support." This reflects the diversity of the engineer branch field. This study leaves the engineers in the branch category as self-reported.

<u>Internal Reliability</u>

In order to extrapolate how accurately the respondents in this survey represent the total target sample population, the following analysis of branch category and gender is conducted. Of the total 197 students in Division B, 13 were engineers. In order to determine the representation of the survey respondents to the total Division B population, the 13 engineers were divided among the combat arms and combat support branch categories in rough proportion to their self-reported branch category in question three. With seven of the engineers being considered combat arms and six combat support the total Division B population has 91 (46 percent) of the officers in combat arms category, 52 (26 percent) in the combat support category, and 54 (27 percent) in the combat service support category.

Table 5. Comparison of Sample Population to Division B Population

Variable	Sample (N=113)	Actual Division B Population (N=197)	Chi Square
Combat Arms	49/43 %	91/46 %	0.127
Combat Support	31/27 %	52/26 %	0.028
Combat Service Support	33/29 %	54/27 %	0.082
Gender (Male)	105/93 %	178/90 %	0.051
Gender (Female)	8/7 %	19/10 %	0.542

In comparing the actual Division B population (engineer-adjusted) with respondents, the response rate for each branch category is comparatively close. The overall response rate for all branch categories is 58 percent. By branch category, 54 percent of the combat arms category responded, 60 percent of the combat support category, and 61 percent of the combat service support officers responded.

By gender, the Division B population has 19 (10 percent) females. However, only 8 (7 percent) of the respondents to the survey are female. The response rate for females is 42 percent. This is significantly lower than the 59 percent response rate for males. Figure 4 below depicts branch category by gender for the 113 survey respondents.


Figure 4. Branch Category by Gender

Current Grade by Branch Category

Question two asked the respondents their current grade, i.e., O-3 (captain), O-4 (major), or O-5 (lieutenant colonel). The largest grade is O-4 with 105 officers (93 percent), second largest is O-3 with 6 officers (5 percent), and the smallest, O-5 with 2 officers (2 percent). The by grade distribution shows that the two O-5s (lieutenant colonels) are both in the CSS category (see Figure 5.). The distinction of captain may be even less significant than the numbers indicate since all of the remaining captains in the class were promoted to major by 1 March 1997.

Ranger Qualification

Question six asked the respondent if they are Ranger qualified. The largest branch category with Ranger-qualified officers is the combat arms with eighteen officers (58 percent, N = 49), the second largest is combat support with eight officers (35 percent, N = 31), and the

Figure 5. Current Grade by Branch Category

smallest branch category, combat service support with five officers (18 percent, N = 33). The 31

ranger qualified officers comprised 27 percent of the total officer population (see figure 6). The

significance of Ranger training and its attendant emphasis on direct action missions warrant

separate treatment of this population on select variables.

Figure 6. Ranger Qualification by Branch Category

Attitudes Toward Peacekeeping

Questions seven through ten are the same questions asked by the 1984, 1990, and 1994

studies. These questions used the Likert scale to determine the officer's attitude towards OOTW.

These responses are broken down into three categories, combining the responses "strongly agree" and "agree" into one value and "disagree" and "strongly disagree" into one value and retaining the middle response of "neither agree nor disagree." These values were combined for simplicity of data analysis and because the three previous studies had combined them in the same manner.

Additional Training for Peacekeeping

Question seven asks if "a soldier who is well trained in military skills still requires additional skills for peacekeeping service?" Figure 7 depicts these responses.


Figure 7. Additional Training Required for OOTW by Branch Category

The most frequent response for all branch categories is "agree" or "strongly agree" that "a soldier who is well-trained in military skills still requires additional skills for peacekeeping service." Overall, 106 (94 percent) of the officers said they thought additional training is required. By branch category 45 (92 percent) of the combat arms, 29 (94 percent) of the combat support, and 32 (97 percent) of the combat service support officers said they "agree" or "strongly agree" that "a soldier who is well trained in military skills still requires additional skills for peacekeeping service."

The second most frequent response for all branch categories is "disagree" or "strongly disagree." However, the numbers are very small and statistically not significantly different from

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the number who said "neither agree/disagree." Overall, 4 (3 percent) of the officers said they "disagree" or "strongly disagree." By branch category 2 (4 percent) of the combat arms, 1 (3 percent) of the combat support, and 1 (3 percent) of the combat service support officers said they "disagree" or "strongly disagree."

The least frequent response for all branch categories is "neither agree/disagree." Overall, 3 (3 percent) of the officers said they "neither agree/disagree." By branch category 2 (4 percent) of the combat arms, one (3 percent) of the combat support, and none (0 percent) of the combat service support officers said they "neither agree/disagree" that "a soldier who is well-trained in military skills still requires additional skills for peacekeeping."

Effectiveness in Peacekeeping Without the Use of Force

Question eight asks if, "A soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job even if he cannot use force except in self-defense?" Figure 8 displays the results of each branch category and the entire sample.

The most frequent response for all branch categories is "agree" or "strongly agree" that "a soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job even if he cannot use force except in self-defense." Overall, 81 (72 percent) of the officers said they "agree" or "strongly agree." By branch category, 40 (82 percent) of the combat arms, 17 (55 percent) of the combat support, and 24 (73 percent) of the combat service support officers said they "agree" or "strongly agree" that "a soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job even if he cannot use force except in self-defense." It is noteworthy that the branch category most likely to require using force in the routine performance of their duties (combat arms) reported the highest level of agreement with the question.

Figure 8. Soldier Effectiveness in Peacekeeping Without the Use of Force

The second most frequent response for all branch categories is "disagree" or "strongly disagree." Overall, 22 (19 percent) of the officers said they "disagree" or "strongly disagree." By branch category 7 (14 percent) of the combat arms, 9 (29 percent) of the combat support, and 6 (18 percent) of the combat service support officers said they "disagree" or "strongly disagree" that "a soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job even if he cannot use force except in self-defense."

The least frequent response for all branch categories is "neither agree nor disagree." Overall, 10 (9 percent) of the officers said they "neither agree nor disagree." By branch category 2 (4 percent) of the combat arms, 5 (16 percent) of the combat support, and 3 (9 percent) of the combat service support officers said they "neither agree nor disagree" that "a soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job even if he cannot use force except in self-defense."

Is Peacekeeping the Right Mission

Question nine asks if, "Being part of a peacekeeping force is the kind of job you think soldiers in your unit should be doing?" The answer was based upon the respondents last tactical unit or the unit they last deployed with for an OOTW. Figure 9 displays the results for each branch category and the entire sample.

Figure 9. Being Part of a Peacekeeping Force and Unit Participation

The most frequent response for all branch categories is "agree" or "strongly agree" that, "Being part of a peacekeeping force is the kind of job you think soldiers in your unit should be doing." Overall, 44 (39 percent) of the officers said they "agree" or "strongly agree." By branch category, 17 (35 percent) of the combat arms, 12 (39 percent) of the combat support, and 15 (45 percent) of the combat service support officers said, they "agree" or "strongly agree" that,. "Being part of a peacekeeping force is the kind of job you think soldiers in your unit should be doing."

The second most frequent response for all branch categories is "disagree" or "strongly disagree." Overall, 39 (35 percent) of the officers said they "disagree" or "strongly disagree." By branch category, 23 (47 percent) of the combat arms, 8 (26 percent) of the combat support, and 8 (24 percent) of the combat service support officers said they "disagree" or "strongly disagree" that, "Being part of a peacekeeping force is the kind of job you think soldiers in your unit should be doing."

The least frequent response for all branch categories is "neither agree nor disagree." Overall, 30 (27 percent) of the officers said they "neither agree nor disagree." By branch category, 9 (18 percent) of the combat arms, 11 (35 percent) of the combat support, and 10 (30 percent) of the combat service support officers said they "neither agree nor disagree" that., "Being part of a peacekeeping force is the kind of job you think soldiers in your unit should be doing."

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The largest and only statistically significant difference between branch categories is in the percentage of combat arms officers who disagree that peacekeeping is something soldiers in their unit should be doing (see Table 6). Nearly twice the percentage of combat arms officers (47 percent) disagreed, compared to combat support (26 percent) and combat service support at (24 percent) disagreeing.

Table 6. Being Part of a Peacekeeping Force and Unit Participation

Being Part of a Peacekeeping Force Appropriateness	Agree/ Strongly Agree	Neither Agree/Disagree	Disagree/ Strongly Disagree	Chi Square
Combat Arms	17/35 %	9/18 %	23/47 %	3.654*
Combat Support	12/39 %	11/35 %	8/26 %	1.613
Combat Service Support	15/45 %	10/30 %	8/24 %	1.544

* Statistically Significant to the .05 level

Should American Troops Help Solve Other Peoples Problems

Question ten asks if "It is a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples problems?" Figure 10 displays the results for each branch category and the entire sample.


Figure 10. American Troops Being Used to Help Solve Other Peoples Problems

The most frequent response for all branch categories is "disagree" or "strongly disagree" that, "It is a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples problems." Overall, 66 (58 percent) of the officers said they "disagree" or "strongly disagree." By branch category, 32 (65 percent) of the combat arms, 17 (55 percent) of the combat support, and 17 (52 percent) of the combat service support officers said they "disagree" or "strongly disagree" that, "It is a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples problems."

The second most frequent response for all branch categories is "neither agree nor disagree." Overall, 29 (26 percent) of the officers said they "neither agree nor disagree." By branch category, 14 (29 percent) of the combat arms, 6 (19 percent) of the combat support, and 9 (27 percent) of the combat service support officers said they "neither agree nor disagree" that, "It is a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples problems."

The least frequent response for all branch categories is "agree" or "strongly agree" that, "It is a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples problems." Overall, 18 (16 percent) of the officers said they "agree" or "strongly agree." By branch category, 3 (6 percent) of the combat arms, 8 (26 percent) of the combat support, and 7 (21 percent) of the combat service support officers said, they "agree" or "strongly agree" that, "It is a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples problems."

It should be noted that this question, and the three preceding questions are awkwardly worded. They are taken verbatim from the three previously conducted surveys (1984, 1990, and 1994). Two officers wrote "poorly worded question" and several officers wrote comments such as "depends if it is in the nation's vital interest." The wording was not changed in order to retain longitudinal consistency.

<u>Desired Future Frequency of OOTW</u>

Question eleven asks if the respondent would like to see more OOTW deployments for the US Army. Most noticeably, not one of the respondents indicated they wanted to see more deployments. Overall, 20 (18 percent) of the officers said they would like to see the tempo of OOTW deployments remain the same. Overall, 74 (65 percent) of the officers said they would like to see the tempo of OOTW deployments decrease, and, 19 (17 percent) of the officers said they had no opinion. By branch category 9 (18 percent) of the combat arms, 6 (19 percent) of the combat support, and 5 (15 percent) of the combat service support officers said "about the same" number of OOTW deployments (see Figure 11).


Figure 11. Desired Future Frequency of OOTW

The most frequent response for all branch categories is "less" OOTW deployments. By branch category 33 (67 percent) of the combat arms, 20 (65 percent) of the combat support, and 21 (64 percent) of the combat service support officers said they wanted to see "less" OOTW deployments for the US Army.

<u>Application of OOTW Tactics and Skills to Warfighting</u>

Question twelve asked, "Are the skills learned/employed during OOTW missions useful to warfighting?"

The most frequent response for all branch categories is that "the skills learned/employed during OOTW missions are 'somewhat useful' to warfighting" (see Figure 12). Overall, 74 (65 percent) of the officers said "somewhat useful." By branch category 30 (61 percent) of the combat arms, 21 (68 percent) of the combat support, and 23 (70 percent) of the combat service support officers said that "the skills learned/employed during OOTW missions are 'somewhat useful' to warfighting."


Figure 12. Application of OOTW Tactics and Skills to Warfighting

The second most frequent response for all branch categories is "very useful." (It should be noted that there is only a slight difference between the number reporting "very useful" and not useful.) Overall, 16 (14 percent) of the officers said that the that "the skills learned/employed during OOTW missions are 'very useful' to warfighting." By branch category 7 (14 percent) of the combat arms, 3 (10 percent) of the combat support, and 6 (18 percent) of the combat service support officers said "very useful."

The third most frequent response for all branch categories is "not useful." Overall, 14 (12 percent) of the officers said that, "the skills learned/employed during OOTW missions are 'not useful' to warfighting." By branch category 7 (14 percent) of the combat arms, 4 (13 percent) of

the combat support, and 3 (9 percent) of the combat service support officers said "not useful."

The least frequent response for all branch categories is "no opinion." Overall, 9 (8 percent) of the officers said that they had "no opinion" as to whether, "the skills learned/employed during OOTW missions are useful to warfighting." By branch category 5 (10 percent) of the combat arms. 3 (10 percent) of the combat support, and 1 (3 percent) of the combat service support officers said that they had "no opinion" as to whether, as to whether "the skills learned/employed during OOTW missions are useful to warfighting."

OOTW OPTEMPO and Declining Benefits Effects on Separation

Question thirteen asked if, "An increase in OOTW missions or continuance at the present tempo could cause me to separate from the service prior to retirement." Question fourteen asked, "The continued erosion of benefits (medical, dental, monetary) could cause me to separate from the service prior to retirement." The agree and strongly agree responses are combined, as are the disagree and strongly disagree responses (see Figure 13).

The respondents indicated that the "increase in OOTW missions or continuance at the present tempo" is less significant than the "continued erosion of benefits (medical, dental, monetary)" in the decision process of considering separation from the service prior to retirement Twenty-one of the officers (19 percent) said that an increase in tempo of OOTW missions "could cause me to separate from the service prior to retirement." Forty-seven (42 percent) of the officers. or over twice as many, said the "continued erosion of benefits (medical, dental, monetary) could cause me to separate from the service prior to retirement."

It is noteworthy that the Army was undergoing a transition to "Tricare," a new medical program that involves a greater cost to the typical soldier as this survey was administered.

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Figure 13. OOTW OPTEMPO and Declining Benefits Effects on Separation

Combat Experience

Question fifteen asks "Which of the following operations have you participated in?" The

choices were Vietnam, Grenada (URGENT FURY), Panama (JUST CAUSE), and/or SWA

(DESERT STORM). A total of 50 (44 percent) of the officers participated in at least one of

the aforementioned "combat" operations. Five (4 percent) of the officers had participated in

two of the operations, for a total of 55 operations (see Figure 14.).

Figure 14. Combat Experience

OOTW Experience

Question sixteen asked, "Which of the following OOTW operations have you participated in?" The choices were Restore/Continue Hope (Somalia), Joint Endeavor (Bosnia/Herzegovina), Uphold Democracy (Haiti), Multi-national Force Observer (MFO), or other (a blank space was provided to write in the specific operation(s). A total of 40 (35 percent) of the officers participated in at least one OOTW operation (see Figure 15). Sixteen (14 percent) of the officers had participated in two OOTW missions, and six (5 percent) of the officers had participated in three OOTW missions, for a total of 62 OOTW missions.


Figure 15. OOTW Experience

A partial breakdown of the 32 missions in the "other" category shows that 9 (28 percent) were hurricane relief operations (seven were Hurricane Andrew and two were Hurricane Iniki). The second most frequent mission was 7 (22 percent) UN operations, primarily as an individual observer to a specified UN mission. The third most frequent was Provide Comfort with 4 (13 percent) of the missions. Others listed include, the Los Angeles Riots (2), and the Cuban

Refugees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (2), Support Hope in Rwanda (2), Provide Hope in Russia (1), Prime Chance (1), and participation in a flexible deterrent option (FDO) deployment to Korea (1).

Type of Unit During OOTW Deployment

Question seventeen asked for the "Type of unit you served in while deployed on OOTW (e.g. Light Inf Bde, Abn Arty Bn, etc.)" Each response is provided in Table 7 on the following page. The type of unit is based on the respondents self-determined description of his unit. Column one indicates the self-determined type of unit for each of the forty officers that deployed on an OOTW operation. The second column indicates the type of unit that same individual served in on his second deployment, and the third column indicates the type unit for those six individuals that had three OOTW deployments.

In many cases the description is not specific enough to draw further inferences. For example, the four respondents reporting "armor division" did not indicate whether they were serving in a maneuver battalion or in the division G-1 staff section, hence, it would be unreasonable to use this response for further data analysis.

Table 7. Type of Unit During OOTW Deployment

TYPE OF UNIT DEPLOYMENT 1	TYPE OF UNIT DEPLOYMENT 2	TYPE OF UNIT DEPLOYMENT 3
ABN DIV HQ		
ABN INF BN	LT INF BN	
AERO MEDEVAC	AERO MEDEVAC	
ARMOR DIV		
ARMOR DIV		
ARMOR DIV		
ARMORED CORPS		
ASG		
AVN		
AVN BDE		
AVN BN		
AVN BN		
AVN BN		
CORPS AVN BDE		
COSCOM	ABN CORPS	ARMOR DIV
COSCOM STAFF		
CSS	CSS	
CSS BN		
DIV MP CO	DIV MP CO	PSYOP
DIV SIG BN		
DOD AGENCY		
EAC	EAC	EAC
ENG	ENG	ENG
JTF HQ		
JTF HQ, SIG BN		
LOG		
LT INF	ABN INF	ABN INF
LT INF DISCOM		
MULTI NATL CI		
MP CO		
MULTI NATL LT DIV	ARMOR DIV	
NATO	ABN DISCOM	
PSYOP	PSYOP	
PSYOP	PSYOP	
SF GP	SF GP	
SOF AVN		
SOF AVN	SOF AVN	SOF AVN
TRADOC		
UN OBSERVER	LT INF BN	
UN OBSERVER		

Principal Unit Mission/Role

Question eighteen asked, "What was the principal role/mission of your unit?" The respondent had the choice of what best described their unit's role. Overall, 11 (18 percent) of the

respondents described their unit's mission as "disaster relief," 15 (24 percent) described their

unit's mission as "humanitarian assistance," 14 (23 percent) as "peace enforcement," 12 (19

percent) as peace keeping, and, 10 (16 percent) described their unit's mission as "other." These

included, the Los Angeles Riots (2), counterinsurgency, contingency, logistics support, flexible

deterrent option participants, etc. (see Figure 16).

Figure 16. Principal Unit Role/Mission

Unit Mission Accomplishment

Question nineteen asks, "Did your unit accomplish its OOTW mission?" Of the 62

OOTW missions reported in this survey 61 were rated either; "completely," "partially," "barely,"

or "not at all." (One respondent did not provide a rating.) Overall, forty-six (75 percent)

considered their unit "completely" successful. Twelve (20 percent) considered their unit's

OOTW mission as "partially" successful, one (2 percent) unit was rated as being "barely"

successful. and two (3 percent) rated their unit "not at all" successful.

When the respondents ratings of the various operations are analyzed, the operations most

frequently rated "completely successful" are Somalia and Haiti at 86 percent. (See Table 8.) Next

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is the MFO with 80 percent of respondents rating their mission "completely successful." The "other" category had a 74 percent "completely successful" rating. The lowest "completely successful" rating was for Joint Endeavor (Bosnia) at 64 percent.

Table 8. Unit Mission Accomplishment

	Completely	Partially	Barely	Not at All
Somalia	6/86 %	1/14 %	0	0
Bosnia	7/64 %	3/27 %	0	1/10 %
Haiti	6/86 %	1/14 %	0	0
MFO	4/80 %	0	1/20 %	0
Other	23/74 %	7/23 %	0	1/3 %
All	46/75 %	12/20 %	1/2 %	2/3 %

This might be attributable to the fact that Joint Endeavor is still an ongoing operation rather than an indictment of unit performance. The numbers involved in these responses are also relatively small so the conclusions drawn must be cautiously weighed. (Note: The overall average for all missions rated "completely successful" is 75 percent.)

Mission Appropriateness for Unit

Question twenty asked, "In your opinion, was the mission the appropriate for your unit?" The results are analyzed by branch category (question 3) and by type of principal role/mission (question 18). Options were "very appropriate," "appropriate," "not appropriate," or, "no opinion."

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The most frequent response for all branch categories is "very appropriate." Overall, 25

(40 percent) of the officers said that, in their opinion, the mission was "very appropriate" for their

unit. By branch category, 8 (35 percent) of the combat arms, 11 (61 percent) of the combat

support, and 6 (29 percent) of the combat service support officers said the mission was "very

appropriate" for their unit (see Figure 17).

Figure 17. Mission Appropriateness by Branch Category

The second most frequent response for all branch categories is "appropriate." Overall,

23 (37 percent) of the officers said the mission was "appropriate" for their unit. By branch

category, 10 (43 percent) of the combat arms, 3 (17 percent) of the combat support, and 10 (48

percent) of the combat service support officers said the mission was "very appropriate" for their

unit.

The least frequent response for all branch categories (except the two respondents that

had "no opinion") is "not appropriate." Overall, 12 (19 percent) of the officers said the mission

was "not appropriate" for their unit. By branch category, 3 (13 percent) of the combat arms, 4

(22 percent) of the combat support, and 5 (24 percent) of the combat service support officers said

the mission was "not appropriate" for their unit.

Overall, in rating mission appropriateness for the unit by type of mission (see Figure 18)

the plurality of missions were rated "very appropriate," 25 of 62, or (40 percent). By type of

mission, the type mission rated "very appropriate" the most is "disaster relief" with 7 (64 percent)

of the respondents rating that specific mission deployment as "very appropriate." Next is the

"other" category with 6 (60 percent) rating that specific mission deployment as "very

appropriate," followed by "humanitarian assistance" with 5 (33 percent), then "peace

enforcement" with 4 (29 percent) of the respondents rating that specific mission deployment as

"very appropriate."

Figure 18. Mission Appropriateness for the Unit by Type of Mission

By type of mission, the type mission rated "very appropriate" the least is "peacekeeping"

with 3 (25 percent) of the respondents rating that specific mission deployment as "very

appropriate." It should be remembered that the numbers participating in each type of mission is comparatively small.

Mission Appropriateness for the Unit and the Army

Question twenty asked, "In your opinion, was the mission the appropriate for your unit?" Questions twenty-one asked, "In your opinion, was the mission appropriate for our Army?" The results when compared indicate 26 (42 percent) of the respondents described the mission as "very appropriate" for their unit, yet only 20 (32 percent) thought it was "very appropriate" for the army (see Figure 19). The number that thought it was "appropriate" were roughly equal, 26 (37 percent) for the unit, 22 (35 percent) for the army. For the unit "not appropriate" was indicated 11 (18 percent), the army 18 (29 percent) of the time. The number indicating "no opinion," 2 (3 percent), was equal for both categories.


Figure 19. Mission Appropriateness for the Unit and the Army

Length of OOTW Deployment

Question twenty-two asked the respondent to indicate the length they were deployed (to the nearest month). Choices were: 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, 4-6 months, or more than 6 months. The most frequent mission length is 4-6 months with 19 (32 percent), followed by one

month 18 (30 percent), then three months 11 (18 percent). Seven missions (12 percent) were over

six months and five missions (8 percent) lasted two months. The results are depicted below in

Figure 20.

Figure 20. Length of OOTW Deployment

OOTW Deployment Effects on Combat Readiness

Question twenty-three asked, "As a result of your unit's deployment, was your unit more

or less combat ready after the operation?" The combat arms and combat support officers both

rated the deployments as more negative on readiness, the combat service support officers rated the

mission as enhancing combat readiness (see Figure 21). Overall, 56 officers registered an opinion

on combat readiness (six had no opinion). The largest number of all branch categories is less

combat ready (41 percent), no difference (34 percent), and finally, more combat ready (25

percent).

For the combat arms branch category only one (5 percent) of the 22 combat arms

respondents deployed on an OOTW mission reported his unit as "more combat ready." Nine

(41 percent) of the combat arms officers felt their unit was less combat ready, 11 (50 percent)

reported no difference, and 5 (23 percent) had no opinion on the missions impact.

For the combat support branch category four (22 percent) of the 18 combat support

respondents reported his unit as "more combat ready." Seven (39 percent) of the combat support officers felt their unit was less combat ready, 6 (33 percent) reported no difference, and one (6 percent) had no opinion on the missions impact.

For the combat service support branch category nine (43 percent) of the 21 combat service support respondents reported his unit as "more combat ready." Seven (33 percent) of the combat service support officers felt their unit was less combat ready, two (10 percent) reported no difference, and three (14 percent) had no opinion on the missions impact.

Figure 21. OOTW Deployment Effects on Combat Readiness by Branch Category

Impact on Willingness to Employ Lethal Force

Question twenty-four asked, "As a result of your participation in OOTW deployment(s) how do you think it has affected your willingness to employ lethal force in future combat operations?" The overwhelming majority 36 (90 percent) responded either no difference or no opinion (see Figure 22). Three (8 percent) of the officers said that they were less likely to use lethal force, while only one officer (3 percent) said he was more likely to use lethal force (note: this officer reported that he had participated in Joint Endeavor and counterinsurgency operations

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in Turkey prior to Desert Storm). Based upon this survey it would suggest that participation in

OOTW may have an effect on the willingness to employ lethal force in subsequent operations,

albeit very slight.

Figure 22. Impact on Willingness to Employ Lethal Force

Broad Patterns of Outcomes

Demographics

Overall, the surveyed population resembles the Division B population (and the entire

CGSOC class). Demographically, the typical (modal) officer in this survey is a male, combat

arms, major, commissioned through ROTC, with 29 officers in this category it constitutes 26

percent of the respondents. Sixty-six (58 percent) of the respondents are male, major, and

commissioned through ROTC. Ninety-seven (86 percent) are male majors. The largest

demographic categories of the total surveyed population are: major (93 percent), male (93

percent), non-ranger qualified (73 percent), ROTC (70 percent), and, combat arms (43 percent).

Attitudes Towards Peacekeeping

The overwhelmingly majority (94 percent) of the respondents believed additional training

is required for even a well-trained soldier to perform peacekeeping service. The majority (72

percent) felt a soldier could be effective even if he could only use force in self-defense. The response was divided about peacekeeping being the right mission, 39 percent said they agree, 35 percent disagreed, and 27 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. In response to US troops helping solve other peoples problems, 58 percent did not think it was a mistake, 16 percent thought it was a mistake, and 26 percent neither agreed or nor disagreed. In terms of the skills learned or employed during OOTW operations being useful to warfighting, all of the branch categories were relatively similar with 65 percent reporting somewhat useful and 14 percent very useful.

Frequency of OOTW and Separation from the Service

None of the respondents in the survey wanted to see the more OOTW deployments. Sixty-five percent wanted to see less OOTW deployments, eighteen percent the same, and seventeen percent had no opinion. Nineteen percent of the officers said an increase in the tempo of OOTW operations could cause them to separate from the army prior to retirement, however sixty-five percent said an increase in OOTW operations would not cause them to separate prior to retirement.

Relationship of Outcomes to Each Other

The percentage of OOTW participants that had combat experience is similar to the total survey population. Of the fifty respondents that had combat experience, seventeen (34 percent) had OOTW experience, compared to 35 percent for the total survey population. Of the forty respondents that had OOTW experience, seventeen (43 percent) had combat experience, similar to the 44 percent for the total survey population.

Comparisons of OOTW Participant Attitudes to Non-participant Attitudes

The attitudes of the midgrade officer with OOTW experience are similar on most questions to the midgrade officer with no OOTW experience. The most notable differences are in

the response to, "a soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job even if he cannot use force except in self-defense." An actual OOTW participant was 7 percent more likely than a respondent with no OOTW experience to agree or strongly agree. This may indicate that a lack of actual experience causes speculation that the use of force is essential for mission effectiveness. Conversely, familiarity with the OOTW mission may result in the conclusion that force is not that effective in peacekeeping.

When asked whether an increase in OOTW missions or continuance at the present tempo could cause them to separate from the service prior to retirement, the actual OOTW participants were thirty percent more likely to agree or strongly agree. This may indicate that those who have no OOTW experience are not familiar with the relative hardships in OOTW deployments. A comparison of participant and nonparticipant attitudes is provided in table 9.

When looking at participants in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti, they all expressed a higher likelihood of separating from the service if the tempo of OOTW operations increases than those respondents that have not participated in any OOTW operation. When asked whether an increase in OOTW missions or continuance at the present tempo could cause them to separate from the service prior to retirement 16 percent of those with no OOTW experience agreed or strongly agreed, for Bosnia participants 18 percent (N=7), for Somalia participants 29 percent (N=7), and for Haiti participants 43 percent (N=7). These results suggest that the nature and/or outcome of the particular OOTW operation matters. Although the numbers involved are small, the fact that the percentage of those considering separation prior to retirement if OOTW tempo increases for participants in Somalia is nearly twice as large, and Haiti almost three times greater than those with no OOTW experience suggests the nature of the operations may be relevant.

Table 9. Comparison of OOTW Participant Attitudes to Non-participant Attitudes

(Percent agreeing or strongly agreeing)	OOTW EXPERIENCE (N=40)	NO OOTW EXPERIENCE (N=73)	CHI Square
A soldier who is well-trained in military skills still requires additional skills for peacekeeping service.	38/95 %	68/93 %	0.009
A soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job even if he cannot use force except in self-defense.	30/75 %	51/70 %	0.095
Being part of a peacekeeping force is the kind of job you think soldiers in your unit should be doing.	16/40 %	28/38 %	0.018
It is a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples problems.	5/13 %	13/18 %	0.457
I would like to see **less** OOTW deployments for the US Army.	28/70 %	46/63 %	0.192
The skills/tactics learned/employed during OOTW missions are useful to warfighting.	26/65 %	52/71 %	0.145
An increase in OOTW missions or continuance at the present tempo could cause me to separate from the service prior to retirement.	9/23 %	12/16 %	0.646

Comparisons of Ranger Qualified Attitudes to Non-Ranger Attitudes

When controlling for ranger training it has a minor effect on most variables. The ranger qualified officer was slightly more likely (3 percent) to say that a soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job even if he cannot use force except in self-defense. This may reflect a confidence (or ignorance) that the non-ranger qualified officer lacks. He was also a little more likely (4 percent) to say that being part of a peacekeeping force is the kind of job you think soldiers in his unit should be doing. (The response was based on the respondent's last tactical unit or the unit he last deployed with for an OOTW operation.) This may indicate as much about the type of unit the ranger qualified officer is typically assigned to (light, airborne, air assault) as much as it does about the influence of ranger training upon attitudes. Table 10 below compares ranger and non-ranger attitudes.

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Table 10. Comparisons of Ranger Qualified Attitudes to Non-Ranger Attitudes

(Percent agreeing or strongly agreeing)	RANGER QUALIFIED (N=31)	NON-RANGER QUALIFIED (N=82)	CHI Square
A soldier who is well-trained in military skills still requires additional skills for peacekeeping service.	29/94 %	77/94 %	0.000
A soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job even if he cannot use force except in self-defense.	23/74 %	58/71 %	0.111
Being part of a peacekeeping force is the kind of job you think soldiers in your unit should be doing	13/42 %	31/38 %	0.099
It is a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples problems	5/16 %	13/16 %	0.001
I would like to see **less** OOTW deployments for the US Army	24/77 %	50/61 %	0.929
The skills/tactics learned/employed during OOTW missions are useful to warfighting	22/71 %	56/68 %	0.023
An increase in OOTW missions or continuance at the present tempo could cause me to separate from the service prior to retirement	7/23 %	14/17 %	0.367

The ranger qualified officer was actually less likely to have been deployed on an OOTW operation than the non-ranger qualified officer. The overall likelihood for participating in at least one OOTW operation for the surveyed population is 35 percent, for the ranger qualified officer it is 32 percent, and the non-ranger qualified officer, it is slightly above the average at 37 percent. The lower OOTW participation rate might suggest that the ranger qualified officer's attitudes would more closely resemble the non-participant's attitudes. In fact, the strongest distinction ranger training demonstrates is on the desire to see less OOTW operations in the future (although it does not reach the statistically significant level of .05). For the entire population of OOTW participants, 70 percent said less deployments, only 63 percent of the non-participants said less deployments. Of the ranger qualified officers, 77 percent reported desiring less OOTW deployments in the future.

Relationship of Outcomes to Other Studies

The Proliferation of Peace Operations and U.S. Army Tactical Proficiency: Will the Army Remain a Combat Ready Force?

In a 1995 monograph, Major Robert J. Botters, Jr., examined the degree to which tactical unit core competencies are reinforced or degraded by preparation for and execution of peace operations. He concludes that participation in peace operations can adversely affect the warfighting skills of tactical units. Evidence suggests units trained and organized for combat operations can maintain core competencies in warfighting skills while participating in peace operations, if provided adequate resources for training perishable collective warfighting skills.[3]

In this study the midgrade officers report an increasing correlation of OOTW skills to warfighting skills along branch category lines with the combat service support category the highest and the combat arms category the lowest. For all branch categories 80 percent report that "the skills learned/employed during OOTW missions are 'useful' or 'somewhat useful' to warfighting." By branch category 76 percent of the combat arms, 77 percent of the combat support, and 88 percent of the combat service support officers said that "the skills learned/ employed during OOTW missions are 'useful' or 'somewhat useful' to warfighting."

The Effects Operations Other Than War Has on the Readiness of the United States Army

This 1996 study by LTC Jerry D. Hatley warns that, although there are many positive effects that OOTW has on the readiness of the United States Army, and while some units benefit more than others, the prolonged effect could be disastrous to the Army as a whole. Combat units and some combat support units lose the opportunity to train on their warfighting skills while they are involved in peacekeeping missions and all units lose the art of training as a combined arms force in preparing for a defensive or offensive operation. He contends the retraining time after an

OOTW mission requires the Army to perform dedicated training for at least four to six months to return to a high state of combat readiness.[4]

This study on midgrade officers seems to confirm Hatley's contentions. This study finds that officers of all branch categories rated the deployments as more negative than positive on combat readiness. The combat service support officers rated the mission as enhancing combat readiness almost twice as often as the combat support officers, and eight times more often than the combat arms category officer.

For the combat arms branch category only 5 percent (N=22) of the respondents deployed on an OOTW mission reported that his unit was "more combat ready" afterwards. For the combat support branch category 22 percent (N=18) of the respondents reported his unit as "more combat ready." For the combat service support branch category 43 percent (N=21) of the combat service support respondents reported his unit as "more combat ready."

Attitudes Toward Peace Operations Among U.S. Infantry Soldiers in Macedonia

In the 1994 study by Vaitkus and Bartone entitled "Attitudes Toward Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Among U.S. Infantry Soldiers Deployed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" the 6-502nd Infantry Battalion was examined after being deployed to Macedonia for peacekeeping operations. Included are the results of two previous studies, the first is on airborne infantry soldiers deployed to the MFO in 1984, and the second, a light infantry unit deployed to the MFO in 1990.[5] These three previous studies are compared alongside of the results of this study in table 11.

The largest difference between the midgrade officer and any other study's results regards the need for additional training. The midgrade officer in this study is nearly twice as likely as the paratrooper to say additional training is required for peacekeeping. The officers in

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Table 11. Comparisons of Midgrade Officer Attitudes to Previous Studies

(Percent agreeing or strongly agreeing)	Airborne Infantry	Light Infantry	Berlin Brigade	Midgrade Officer
A soldier who is well-trained in military skills still requires additional skills for peacekeeping service.	50 %	78 %	71 %	94 %
A soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job even if he cannot use force except in self-defense.	72 %	NR	66 %	81 %
Being part of a peacekeeping force is the kind of job you think soldiers in your unit should be doing.	55 %	NR	47 %	44 %
It is a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples problems.	6 %	27 %	44 %	16 %
NR = Not explicitly reported, but "not significantly different" from airborne infantry results.				

this survey are also far more likely than the light infantry or Berlin Brigade soldiers to believe that additional training is required. It should be noted that the term "peacekeeping" as used in the 1984 and 1990 studies carried the connotation of MFO-like duty as opposed to the present definition in which it is one specific type of peace operation.

These midgrade attitudes may reflect the belief that the complexity of OOTW has increased over time. The development of more doctrine advocating pre-mission training should have contributed to this belief as well. The comparatively lower number of paratroopers that believe additional training is required may reflect a higher level of confidence in their abilities to handle any situation, arguably the more elite the unit, the lower the belief additional training is required.

The youthful nature of the respondents in the other studies may provide a sense of bravado that would see additional training as a sign of weakness. The vantage of a midgrade officer might also promote a desire to do anything (including additional training) that would mitigate the probability of failure (or at least no appreciable defects) during the conduct of an OOTW mission.

The midgrade officer reports a lower need for the use of force to be effective in peacekeeping than the other units surveyed. The midgrade officer was also the most likely to report peacekeeping as an inappropriate mission for his unit (based on their last tactical unit assignment). In willingness to use American troops to help solve other peoples problems, the midgrade officer was second only to the paratrooper.

Description and Explanation of Anomalies

Willingness to Help Others and Differences Among Branch Categories

A peculiar outcome involves the respondents in the combat arms category. The combat arms willingness to use American troops to help solve other peoples problems and their view that this is an inappropriate mission for soldiers in their unit to be doing, apparently indicates they expect someone else to perform this mission. Sixty-five percent of the combat arms respondents think it is not a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples problems, compared to 55 percent of the combat support and 52 percent of the combat service support.

However, when asked if "being part of a peacekeeping force is the kind of job you think soldiers in your unit should be doing" only 35 percent of the combat arms agreed. Yet 39 percent of the combat support, and 45 percent of the combat service support officers said, they "agree" or "strongly agree." This seems to indicate that the midgrade officer's support for using American troops to solve other peoples problems goes down as the appropriateness for one's own unit being the one deployed increases.

Acknowledgment of Insufficiencies in Outcomes

This survey merely scratched the surface of a complex issue facing the Army today. Many of questions asked in this survey, by necessity, lacked the depth or background to determine the root causes of the midgrade officer's attitudes. Some selected examples:

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1. The lack of demographical data; political affiliation, religious preference, marital status, number of children, race and ethnicity, all were untreated.

2. The soldier's wife (or husband's) attitudes towards the Army and continued service for their spouse are not examined.

3. Individual education level and schooling (other than Ranger School) are not evaluated.

4. A lack of female representation. (This also created a false over-representation of males in the combat service support category.)

5. The functional area of the respondent was not treated. Many of the officers in this study will never return to a tactical assignment, hence their attitude towards future OOTW tempo may be inaccurate.

6. The effect upon the warrior ethos is not adequately examined.

7. Number of years in service is not factored into the results. Certainly, an officer with only eleven years in service has a different vantage than an officer with 19 $^1/_2$ years.

8. Type of command and composition of forces not explicitly factored. The impact that the UN and multinational forces working together is not evaluated.

9. The level of deprivation, command climate and cohesion of the unit during OOTW deployment(s) is not addressed in this study.

10. Many of the questions were ambiguous or subjective. The questions used in the three previous studies were awkwardly worded and dated.

11. Because of the relatively small sample size when the data was broken down into smaller elements the margin of error increased greatly. The treatment of branches by branch category hindered accuracy.

Last, the differences between OOTW and warfighting are not specifically addressed. What to do about these differences is not covered. Sufficiency of the present doctrine and state of training in the field is not recognized. Some argue that the military can incorporate indoctrination and training to be proficient in performing these operations (which essentially is the army's present position). Others contend doing so would require establishing formal training and indoctrination programs and acquiring appropriate training facilities, thus, in effect, building a completely new program from the ground up. This study does not gain adequate insight into the midgrade officer's outlook on these vital issues.

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[1]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1957), 60-61.

[2] Mark L. Paris, Ph.D. and Joseph M. Rothberg,, "A Factor-analytic Study of Deployment Attitudes of the Sinai Peacekeeping Force." Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Institute of Research, 1984, 175.

[3]Robert J. Botters, Jr., MAJ, "The Proliferation of Peace Operations and U.S. Army Tactical Proficiency: Will the Army Remain a Combat Ready Force?" (School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 43.

[4]Jerry D. Hatley, LTC, USA. "The Effects Operations Other Than War Has on the Readiness of the United States Army," Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (April 1996), 18.

[5]Mark A Vaitkus and Paul T. Bartone, "Attitudes Toward Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Among U.S. Infantry Soldiers Deployed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", (US Army Medical Research Unit-Europe: 1994), 2.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of High Points of Chapters 1-4

Chapter One

To isolate the impact of OOTW operations on the mid-grade officer apart from the relevant influencing factors and the larger social, political, and historical environment is extremely difficult. The life-course theory is a very useful tool to that end. The link between historical events and attitudes is clearly reflected throughout national security strategy and policy, and military doctrine. Past successes and failures have shaped current organizations and the organizational mindset.

The senior military leadership has formally acknowledged and institutionalized the Army's future involvement in operations other than war. They recognize the tremendous increases in the frequency of these operations and the effects they are having on the institution. The leadership anticipates these operations will only increase or continue at the present tempo.

The UN has become increasingly involved in the shaping and conduct of peace operations. Their involvement is not without consequence, both in terms of political ramifications and the actual execution of these operations. The multinational nature of peace operations and the complex crises these operations seek to solve leaves them riddled with challenges. Development of a national policy does not alleviate the dilemma of US involvement in a specific operation.

The last twenty-five years have brought about numerous changes. These changes have occurred within the Army and in the larger society it serves. The end of the Cold War and the

resultant desire to capitalize on the so-called peace dividend has created enormous pressures on the institution.

Chapter Two

There is a limited amount of literature that reveals how institutionalizing the evolving OOTW doctrine and participation in actual OOTW operations is impacting upon the soldier. There is even less specifically regarding the midgrade officer. Although some doctrinal publications provide limited insights into the conduct of OOTW, they provide few insights into the effects of these operations upon the forces involved. The publications do however acknowledge the substantial differences between OOTW and warfighting.

The warrior ethos is acknowledged in the studies as important and authentic, however the effect of peace operations on this ethos are not fully understood. Soldiers showed a marked preference for the direct action mission to the peacekeeping mission, feeling that the higher-intensity mission (in one instance Grenada) was the more appropriate for their unit. The doctrinal publications examined all recognized that OOTW operations effect the mind-set of the "combat-warrior" and that specific retraining or reorientation time is required to regain combat readiness.

It is also evident family issues matter substantially. The main predictor of retention for junior enlisted families was the spouse's unrealistic expectations of what the Army could provide as resources for families of deployed soldiers. The main predictor of retention for NCO couples was the spouse's wish that the soldier either stay in or get out of the Army. Soldiers report high levels of concern about the drawdown and its associated uncertainty for their units and families. Soldiers also reported high levels of stress associated with missing their spouses, boredom and restlessness.

In what some midgrade officers might regard as a self-inflicted wound, one report

concludes that commanders in all the services may be competing for deployments to underscore the value of their units during the current drawdown. A second study asserts unit cohesion cannot be achieved if the soldiers do not have faith in their leadership, mission or purpose and that the execution of missions that lack national support will erode cohesion of fighting units, and that these operations have made a tremendous impact on operational tempo, resources, and funding for training. The means for reconciliation of these competing positions is not revealed in the literature.

The combat readiness of units organized for traditional or primary warfighting roles may experience significant degradation of core competencies. One study cautions that the U.S. Army should avoid non-traditional organizations for peace operations and remain focused on preparing units for combat operations. A second study cautions the conflict and incongruity of peacekeeping may require the military to designate separate fighting forces and peacekeeping forces.

Chapter Three

To determine the midgrade officer's attitudes regarding OOTW a questionnaire was determined to be the preferred method. This also allowed for the inclusion of questions asked in three previous studies of peacekeeping operations. The survey consisted of six sections; demographic data, attitudes towards OOTW operations, usefulness and consequences of OOTW deployments, propensity for service until retirement, combat participation, and, actual OOTW participation.

There are 113 surveys collected and used for analysis, making the survey reliable to the 90 percent confidence level. The response rate overall was 58 percent, by branch category, 54 percent of the combat arms category responded, 60 percent of the combat support category, and 61 percent of the combat service support officers responded.

The majority of midgrade officers believe additional training is required for even a well-trained soldier to perform peacekeeping service. The midgrade officer thinks a soldier could be effective even if he could only use force in self-defense. The response is divided about peacekeeping being the right mission with thirty-nine percent agreeing and thirty-five percent disagreeing. Most respondents didn't think it was a mistake for US troops to help solve other peoples problems and that the skills learned during OOTW operations are somewhat useful to warfighting.

Not one of the respondents in the survey wanted to see the more OOTW deployments, although sixty-five percent wanted to see less. Almost one-fifth of the officers said an increase in the tempo of OOTW operations could cause them to separate from the Army prior to retirement. The continued erosion of benefits was rated over twice that often as a factor for separation.

About one-third of the respondents had OOTW experience, forty-four percent combat experience. The mid-grade officer with OOTW experience differs from the non-participant on the use of force in peacekeeping. OOTW participants were thirty percent more likely than non-participants to agree that an increase in OOTW missions or continuance at the present tempo could cause them to separate prior to retirement. Ranger training also changes the officer's attitudes. Ranger qualification's strongest distinction is on the desire to see less OOTW operations in the future.

Inferences Drawn Based on Chapter 3

The data suggest that there are several areas that may demand the attention of the institution and are divided into three general categories; training and readiness, personnel issues, and the warrior ethos.

The Army has acknowledged the reality and importance of OOTW by the publication of numerous doctrinal publications and incorporating the instruction of this doctrine into its

academic institutions. What the Army has not seemed to master is what priority OOTW should be given in the training of combat units. Furthermore, most participants believe their unit was less combat ready after the OOTW deployment, further degrading the unit's readiness. The demands placed on units by the drawdown, the increased OPTEMPO, and diminishing resources make resolving this dilemma even more complex.

The decline in benefits (perceived or real) is clearly a concern to many midgrade officers. Stopping this trend may be one of the more important actions the senior Army leadership may face. This decline in benefits in conjunction with the increased demands of an increased operational tempo may result in an exodus of midgrade officers.

The warrior ethos may be jeopardized or compromised by OOTW. Over one-third of the officers in this study thought that being part of a peacekeeping force was not the kind of job his soldier should be doing.

Topics for Further Study

1. What are the midgrade officer's attitudes towards training requirements for the OOTW role?

2. What are the midgrade officer's attitudes and opinions on combat readiness when used in this role and are they valid?

3. What are the midgrade officer's attitudes and opinions on the appropriateness of specific OOTW roles and missions?

4. What are the midgrade officer's attitudes towards continued service in the US Army?

5. How do political affiliation, religious preference, and marital status influence the midgrade officer's attitudes towards the OOTW role?

Assessment of the Importance of the Outcomes

By prohibiting the use of the variables political affiliation, religious affiliation, and marital status the potential predictive utility these variables might hold in determining the midgrade officer's attitudes towards OOTW was not realized. It may well be that those attributes are more important than many of the variables examined in this thesis.

The underlying motivation for a soldier's service to his nation are being tested by the events examined in this paper. The importance of the outcomes are only theoretical here, it is in the next conflict that the real consequences are to be recognized. May God bless the USA.

APPENDIX A
(Questionnaire)

MID-GRADE US ARMY OFFICER"S ATTITUDES ON OOTW QUESTIONAIRRE

Dear Fellow CGSC student,

      I'm doing a paper on your attitudes towards OOTW and I'm asking for your assistance. The enclosed survey will take you less than four minutes to complete. This survey is anonymous and for US Army officers only The survey has been approved by Dr. Vicky Scherberger, (Chief, Development Assessment Division) and Dr. John Fishel (faculty adviser).

      Thank you for taking the time to complete this brief survey. Please circle the appropriate answer. Fill in the blank where appropriate. After completing the questionnaire you may put it in my distribution box in **section 7 B, Classroom # 11, Bell Hall,** or fold it in half and place it in one of the distribution drop boxes located in the hallways.

      If you would like to discuss any aspects of this survey or research I may be reached at 651-8707. Again, thanks for your assistance,

Bob Young

MID-GRADE US ARMY OFFICER"S ATTITUDES ON OOTW QUESTIONAIRRE

Please circle the appropriate answer. Fill in the blank where appropriate.

1. Source of Commission

    A. OCS   B. ROTC   C. West Point   D. Other

2. Current grade

    A. O-3   B. O-4   C. O-5

3. What category best describes your branch?

    A. Combat Arms   B. Combat Support   C. Combat Service Support

4. What is your branch and functional area?   Branch _____   FA _____

5. Sex: Male   Female

6. Are you Ranger qualified?   Yes   No

7. A soldier who is well-trained in military skills still requires additional skills for peacekeeping service.

A Strongly agree
B. Somewhat agree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Somewhat disagree
E Strongly disagree

-1-
Turn this page and go to question # 8.

8. A soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job even if he cannot use force except in self-defense.

    A. Strongly agree
    B. Somewhat agree
    C. Neither agree nor disagree
    D. Somewhat disagree
    E. Strongly disagree

9. Being part of a peacekeeping force is the kind of job you think soldiers in your unit should be doing.
(Please answer based upon your last tactical unit or unit you deployed with for OOTW.)

    A. Strongly agree
    B. Somewhat agree
    C. Neither agree nor disagree
    D. Somewhat disagree
    E. Strongly disagree

10. It is a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples problems.

    A. Strongly agree
    B. Somewhat agree
    C. Neither agree nor disagree
    D. Somewhat disagree
    E. Strongly disagree

11. I would like to see _____ OOTW deployments for the U.S. Army.

    A. More deployments
    B. About the same
    C. Less deployments
    D. No opinion

12. Are the skills/tactics learned/employed during OOTW missions useful to warfighting?

    A. Very useful
    B. Somewhat useful
    C. Not useful
    D. No opinion

13. An increase in OOTW missions or continuance at the present tempo could cause me to separate from the service prior to retirement.

    A. Strongly agree
    B. Somewhat agree
    C. Neither agree nor disagree
    D. Somewhat disagree
    E. Strongly disagree

14. The continued erosion of benefits (medical, dental, monetary) could cause me to separate from the service prior to retirement

    A. Strongly agree
    B. Somewhat agree
    C. Neither agree nor disagree
    D. Somewhat disagree
    E. Strongly disagree

15. Which of the following operations have you participated in? *(Please circle all that apply):*

    A. Vietnam
    B. Grenada (URGENT FURY)
    C. Panama (JUST CAUSE)
    D. SWA (DESERT STORM)

16. Which of the following OOTW operations have you participated in? *(Please circle all that apply):*

    A. Somalia
    B. Joint Endeavor (Bosnia/Herzegovina)
    C. Uphold Democracy (Haiti)
    D. Multi-national Force Observer (MFO)
    E. Other *(Please list)* _____
    F. None - If your response is "None" you have completed the survey. Thank you.

17. Type of unit you served in while deployed on OOTW (e.g. Light Inf Bde, Abn Arty Bn, etc.)

    A. Deployment 1 _____
    B. Deployment 2 _____
    C. Deployment 3 _____

18. What was the principal role/mission of your unit (e.g. Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief Operations, Peacekeeping, Peace enforcement, Security/MFO, Other (indicate)?

    A. Deployment 1 _____
    B. Deployment 2 _____
    C. Deployment 3 _____

19. Did your unit accomplish its OOTW mission? *Circle appropriate response(s)*

    A. Deployment 1: Completely Partially Barely Not at all
    B. Deployment 2: Completely Partially Barely Not at all
    C. Deployment 3: Completely Partially Barely Not at all

20. In your opinion, was the mission the appropriate for your unit?

    A. Deployment 1: Very appropriate   Appropriate   Not appropriate   No opinion
    B. Deployment 2: Very appropriate   Appropriate   Not appropriate   No opinion
    C. Deployment 3: Very appropriate   Appropriate   Not appropriate   No opinion

21. In your opinion, was the mission appropriate for our Army?

    A. Deployment 1:   Very appropriate   Appropriate   Not appropriate   No opinion
    B. Deployment 2:   Very appropriate   Appropriate   Not appropriate   No opinion
    C. Deployment 3:   Very appropriate   Appropriate   Not appropriate   No opinion

22. Indicate the length you were deployed (to the nearest month).

    A. Deployment 1:   1 Month   2 Months   3 Months   4-6 Months   More than 6 mos
    B. Deployment 2:   1 Month   2 Months   3 Months   4-6 Months   More than 6 mos
    C. Deployment 3:   1 Month   2 Months   3 Months   4-6 Months   More than 6 mos

23. As a result of your unit's deployment, was your unit more or less combat ready after the operation?

    A. Deployment 1:   More combat ready   . Less combat ready   No Difference   No Opinion
    B. Deployment 2:   More combat ready   . Less combat ready   No Difference   No Opinion
    C. Deployment 3:   More combat ready   . Less combat ready   No Difference   No Opinion

24. As a result of your participation in OOTW deployment(s) how do you think it has affected your willingness to employ lethal force in future combat operations?

    A. More likely to use lethal force
    B. Less likely to use lethal force
    C. No difference
    D. No opinion

This completes the survey.   After Completion Fold here

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